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ABSTRACT 
The law’s complexity is such that even apparently minor changes can have 
numerous “ripple” effects. This Article examines the ripple effects from a 
potential broadening of patent law’s definition of an infringing “offer to sell.” 
Currently, courts limit “offers” to formal, contract-law offers; but a policy 
analysis suggests that “offers” should include advertisements and other 
promotions, which harm patentees via price erosion. Changing the offer 
definition to include advertisements and other promotions requires a careful 
consideration of the effects, including effects on patent litigation, innovation 
incentives, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law, third-party liability, and 
Constitutional concerns. This Article performs that analysis and provides specific 
recommendations for crafting the definition of an infringing “offer” to sell. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Small changes in the law can sometimes have large downstream 
consequences. Such large consequences from small initial changes can be 
called “butterfly effects,” a phrase associated with the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology meteorologist who described how small changes in initial 
weather data may result in large differences in simulated weather conditions.1 
Much like weather forecasting, small changes in the law can have butterfly-like 
 
 1.  See Edward N. Lorenz, Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow, 20 J. ATMOSPHERIC SCI. 
130 (1963). 
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intended and unintended consequences. 
This Article examines the likely consequences in a particular area of law 
undergoing recent refinement—specifically, patent infringement based on an 
“offer to sell.”2 While patent infringement for an offer to sell has been in the 
law since 1996,3 it has received increased attention lately and is fast becoming 
an important tool for patent holders seeking to protect themselves from would-
be infringers of patented technology.4 In its 2010 decision in Transocean 
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.,5 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive 
jurisdiction of patent appeals,6 announced that an offer to sell can be an act of 
infringement even if the offer is made outside of the United States, as long as 
the contemplated sale would have occurred in the United States.7 The potential 
extraterritorial consequences of the Transocean opinion have generated much 
discussion.8 
In addition to recent judicial activity in the area, scholars have analyzed the 
boundaries of infringement for an “offer to sell.”9 In an earlier work, I argued 
that the Federal Circuit’s current standard for an infringing “offer” to sell—
namely, a formal contract-law offer—is sub-optimal from a policy 
perspective.10 I advocated for a broader definition of an “offer,” which would 
 
 2.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). Note that § 271(a) lists several acts that may constitute 
infringement, including making, using, selling, or offering to sell patented technology. Each 
act represents an independent occurrence of infringement. Thus, an offer to sell patented 
technology can infringe even if no sale is ever consummated.  
 3.  Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533, 108 Stat. 4809 
(1994) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012)) (approving a treaty that required, 
among other things, adding “offer to sell” as an independent ground of infringement). 
 4.  See Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent 
Infringement for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability 
Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751 (2003) [hereinafter 
Holbrook, Threat of a Sale]; Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility After 
Transocean, 61 EMORY L.J. 1087 (2012) [hereinafter Holbrook, Transocean]; Melissa Y. 
Lerner, You Can Run, But You Can’t Hide: The Expansion of Direct Infringement and the 
Evisceration of Preventive Contracting in Maersk, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 207 
(2011); Lucas S. Osborn, The Leaky Common Law: An “Offer to Sell” As A Policy Tool in 
Patent Law and Beyond, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 143 (2013) [hereinafter Osborn, Offer as 
a Policy Tool]; Rex W. Miller, II, Note, Construing “Offers to Sell” Patent Infringement: 
Why Economic Interests Rather Than Territoriality Should Guide the Construction, 70 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 403, 442 (2009); Na Zhu, Patent Infringement Through Foreign Offer for Domestic 
Sale: Transocean v. Maersk, 12 J. HIGH TECH. L. 566 (2012). 
 5. 617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010). For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 
16-20, 24, 31-32 and accompanying text.  
 6.  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). 
 7.  Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309. 
 8.  See Holbrook, Transocean, supra note 4; Lerner supra note 4; Miller, supra note 
4; Zhu supra note 4. 
 9.  See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 4, at 764-820; Osborn, Offer as a 
Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 169-94. 
 10.  Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 172-80. 
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include not only formal contract-law offers, but also most advertisements and 
promotions.11 In that work, I demonstrated that the primary policy underlying 
the prohibition of infringing “offers to sell,” which is to prevent a competitor 
from generating commercial interest in infringing technology to the patentee’s 
detriment,12 differs from the policies behind the contract-law definition of an 
offer. I argued that this difference dictates interpreting the word “offer” to 
include advertisements and promotions because they generally will harm the 
patentee by causing price erosion.13 
This Article picks up where my previous policy analysis left off, and 
analyzes the probable real world effects of a change from a narrow contract-law 
“offer” standard to a broader advertisements-and-promotion standard. To 
understand the effects of this potential change, one must understand the 
difference between the narrower and broader definitions of an “offer” 
contrasted in this Article. The narrow contract law definition can be defined as 
“the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify 
another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and 
will conclude it.”14 This definition generally excludes advertisements and other 
promotions because they are not specific enough to warrant the recipient in 
understanding that she is empowered to close the deal.15 On the other hand, 
broadening the “offer” definition to include advertisements and promotions 
would allow a patent holder to sue a competitor based solely on an 
advertisement promoting an infringing device. 
This Article’s analysis reveals not only the obvious intended consequences 
of the broader “offer” definition, but also some dramatic butterfly-like 
unintended consequences. More than simply identifying intended and 
unintended consequences of the change, the Article shows courts and 
lawmakers how to maximize beneficial consequences and minimize any 
harmful ones. 
After an overview of the current law governing an infringing offer to sell in 
Part I, Part II of the Article discusses the most obvious effects of broadening 
the definition of an infringing offer, such as more patent litigation and litigation 
at an earlier time. Part III explores some less obvious ripple effects from the 
proposed law change, including the potential for a vastly expanded 
extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law. The upshot of this analysis is that 
courts must be careful only to impose liability for infringing advertisements 
that are likely to cause harm in the United States. 
 
 11.  Id. at 173-94. 
 12.  E.g., Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309 (citing 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 
160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 13.  Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 173-76. For more about price 
erosion, see infra notes 134136 and accompanying text. 
 14.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981). 
 15.  E.g., 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.4 (Joseph M. Perillo, ed., 
rev. ed. 1993). 
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Part IV discusses the uncertainty that will accompany the proposed law 
change, and suggests a carefully crafted definition of an “offer” that includes 
advertisements and similar promotions, but excludes mere market 
investigations. Market investigations are often necessary before a competitor 
can decide whether to invest in a license to the patent or to attempt to design 
around (avoid) it. To emphasize further how even small changes in the law 
carry extended consequences, Part V briefly discusses some additional ripple 
effects. Finally, Part VI concludes by summarizing the proposed changes and 
tests developed throughout the Article. 
I. A $15,000,000 QUESTION: WHAT IS AN INFRINGING “OFFER”? 
In 2006, Maersk A/S, a Danish shipping company, offered Statoil ASA, a 
Norwegian oil company, the use of its offshore drilling rig for drilling in the 
U.S. waters of the Gulf of Mexico.16 The rig cost hundreds of millions of 
dollars to build17 and would cost the oil company about half-a-million dollars a 
day to lease.18 Before the drilling rig reached U.S. waters and even before the 
rig had finished being built (in Singapore), Transocean19 sued Maersk for 
infringing its U.S. patents covering aspects of the drilling rig.20 How could 
Maersk have infringed U.S. patents before it built, sold, or used anything in the 
United States? The answer lies in a relatively new provision to U.S. patent law 
that makes “offering to sell” a patented invention in the United States an act of 
infringement.21 
 
 16.  Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1307. 
 17.  The parties kept financial information filed under seal, but building cost estimates 
of similar ultra-deepwater drilling rigs demonstrate the immense investment. See Press 
Release, Maersk, Maersk Drilling Orders Ultra Deepwater Drillships (July 5, 2011), 
available at http://www.maersk.com/press/newsandpressreleases/pages/20110705-
090137.aspx (reporting a “total project cost for . . . two drillships is approximately USD 1.3 
billion”). 
 18.  Again, the parties kept financial information filed under seal, but estimates of lease 
rates for similar ultra-deepwater drilling rigs support this figure. See David Phillips, Cost of 
Offshore Drilling Rising as Fast as Oil Prices, CBS MONEY WATCH (May 8, 2008, 3:35 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cost-of-offshore-drilling-rising-as-fast-as-oil-prices/ 
(reporting that the “daily rate that operators pay to rent a high-end, deep-water drilling rig is 
now $500,000 to $550,000”); Marianne Stigset, Maersk Drilling Puts Oil Rig Fleet 
Expansion on Hold as Build Costs Soar, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2011, 3:55 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-18/maersk-drilling-puts-rig-expansion-on-hold-
as-build-costs-soar.html (quoting Maersk’s CEO as saying that daily rental rates for ultra-
deepwater rigs have “had an average of about $450,000 for a while”). 
 19.  Transocean has recently become a familiar name since one of its rigs, the 
Deepwater Horizon, was involved in the explosion and subsequent oil spill on a project 
overseen by British Petroleum (BP). See, e.g., Elizabeth Shogren, Panel Spreads Blame For 
BP Oil Rig Explosion, NPR (Jan. 6, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/06/ 
132680706/panel-spreads-blame-for-bp-oil-rig-explosion. 
 20.  Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1300, 1311. 
 21.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
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As part of the international harmonization of intellectual property laws 
under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(“TRIPS”),22 in 1994 Congress added a provision to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) making 
an “offer to sell” infringing technology an independent act of patent 
infringement.23 Before this amendment, a mere offer to sell would not infringe, 
whereas an actual sale would. 
Infringement based on an offer to sell initially did not generate an 
abundance of attention, but that is changing as patent owners realize they can 
obtain large monetary awards based on infringing offers. Recently, a jury found 
Maersk’s offer to sell its rig infringed Transocean’s patents and awarded 
Transocean $15,000,000.24 Thus, the question of what constitutes an “offer” to 
sell represents a timely question. Uncertainty abounds in this area because 
despite this radical change in the law, Congress gave no instruction about the 
intent or meaning of the new language.25 
The Federal Circuit has provided some contours of an infringing offer to 
sell under § 271(a),26 and two of its cases are relevant to this Article’s analysis. 
First, in Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.,27 the Federal Circuit 
concluded that it should “define § 271(a)’s ‘offer to sell’ liability according to 
the norms of traditional contractual analysis.”28 Specifically, the court relied on 
the definition of an offer in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.29 Second, in 
Transocean,30 the Federal Circuit held that an offer to sell can be an act of 
infringement even if the offer is made outside of the United States, as long as 
the contemplated sale was to occur in the United States.31 The Transocean 
 
 22.  See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 
1C, art. 28, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm3c_e.htm (“Article 28 . . . A patent shall 
confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: . . . to prevent third parties not having the 
owner’s consent from the acts of: . . . offering for sale.”). 
 23.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever . . . offers to sell . . . within . . . the United States 
any patented invention . . . infringes.”). The statute became effective January 1, 1996. See 
also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012)) (approving TRIPS). 
 24.  Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 
F.3d 1340, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing jury award). Although the trial court 
vacated the verdict, the appeals court reinstated it. Id. at 1357-59. 
 25.  See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(“Unfortunately, other than stating that an ‘offer to sell’ includes only those offers ‘in which 
the sale will occur before the expiration of the term of the patent,’ Congress offered no other 
guidance as to the meaning of the phrase . . . . [T]he legislative history of the statute offers 
little additional insight.”) (citation omitted).  
 26.  For a detailed analysis of the Federal Circuit’s case law on this subject, see 
Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 195-99. 
 27.  215 F.3d 1246. 
 28.  Id. at 1254-55. 
 29.  Id. at 1257 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24). 
 30.  617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 31.  Id. at 1309. In this case, the offeror was based in United States but made the offer 
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court also held that an infringing offer to sell may occur even if the device 
offered for sale was not built when the offer was made.32 
As mentioned above, in an earlier work I criticized the Rotec decision from 
a policy perspective and argued that courts should broaden the definition an 
“offer” to include not only contract-law offers, but also advertisements and 
similar promotions.33 This Article takes the analysis further by analyzing the 
practical effects of overruling the Rotec court’s narrow definition of an offer,34 
including how such a change would interact with the Transocean court’s 
extraterritorial reading of an “offer to sell.” Whereas my former article 
discussed what the courts should do, this Article works through the practical 
consequences and provides details for how the courts should do it. 
As we consider the effects of changing the definition of an infringing offer, 
one must keep in mind a fundamental tenet of proving patent infringement: a 
patentee must prove that the accused device includes each and every detail 
required in the patent’s claim.35 Applying this principle to the context of 
infringement based on an offer to sell, the offer to sell (be it an advertisement 
or formal contract law offer) must state, directly or indirectly, that the thing 
being offered includes each and every limitation of the patent claim.36 
Importantly, this Article will assume that the advertisements or promotions of 
interest disclose, directly or by context, each and every limitation of the patent 
claim. This assumption allows the analysis to focus on whether and what kinds 
of advertisements, promotions, or other potentially infringing activity actually 
infringe.37 
The next Part begins the analysis of the real-world effects of a broader 
 
while outside the United States. Although the court did not explicitly rely on the fact that the 
offeror was a U.S. company, the holding might be limited to such scenarios in the future. 
 32.  Id. at 1310 n.4 (“[T]he district court must determine what was offered for sale, not 
what was ultimately delivered.”); id. at 1311 (“[W]e reject Maersk USA’s claim that the 
entire apparatus must have been constructed and ready for use in order to have been sold.”). 
 33.  Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 196-201. 
 34.  It is not unreasonable to think that either the Federal Circuit sitting en banc or the 
Supreme Court might broaden the Rotec court’s narrow contract-law definition of an offer. 
See id. at 184-85, 195-202 (discussing pre-Rotec Federal Circuit decisions that suggest a 
broader definition of an “offer”).  
 35.  Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1358 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). Each claim limitation must be present either literally or under the doctrine 
of equivalents. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). 
The same is true for “method” claims, which recite steps for doing something instead of 
parts of a device or system, but for simplicity I refer to devices throughout. 
 36.  See Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1310-11. For example, an offer to sell a “cell phone” 
would not be specific enough to infringe a patent claim requiring a smart phone that includes 
pinch-to-zoom software. But if the offer was to sell “cell phone model XYZ,” and the 
patentee could prove that model XYZ was a smart phone that includes pinch-to-zoom 
software, the patentee could prove infringement. 
 37.  For convenience, throughout this Article I will often use the term “advertisements” 
without mentioning “other promotions.” Unless otherwise specified, I am using 
“advertisements” as a shorthand for “advertisements and other promotions.”  
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definition of an offer under § 271(a). 
II. OBVIOUS EFFECTS: A BROADER DEFINITION OF AN “OFFER” WILL LEAD TO 
EARLIER AND MORE PATENT LITIGATION 
A. Earlier Patent Litigation 
Consider first one obvious effect: if advertisements alone can infringe, 
patent holders will generally be able to sue at an earlier time than if they had to 
wait for a formal contract-law offer. Because advertisements are invitations for 
the recipient to make an offer, advertisements generally precede formal 
contract-law offers to sell. Rather than having to wait for the formal offer, the 
patent holder would be able to sue when the infringer advertises the infringing 
technology.38 
Allowing infringement to occur at an earlier time does not seem especially 
controversial. Often, the difference in time between an advertisement and the 
corresponding offer to sell will be inconsequential. Even where the difference 
is lengthier, no strong objection to the timing presents itself. In fact, the 
accused infringer may benefit from becoming aware of the infringement claim 
sooner rather than later, because the accused can develop a strategy to avoid 
infringement (such as by stopping production, designing around the patent, or 
taking a license). 
B. More Patent Litigation 
Secondly, a broader “offer” definition would increase the amount of patent 
litigation. This effect is slightly less obvious, but is intuitive when one 
considers the realities of discovering infringing conduct. At first blush, it might 
appear that including advertisements and promotions in the definition of an 
offer would not greatly affect the amount of patent litigation. Since 
advertisements most often merely precede formal contract-law offers to sell, 
one would expect that all the litigation currently based on formal contract-law 
offers would simply shift and be based on the preceding advertisement.39 
 
 38.  The Federal Circuit made a similar point when it observed that contract-law offers 
to sell precede actual sales. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1259-
60 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., concurring) (“The purpose of § 271(a) was to permit a 
patentee to act against threatened infringing sale by establishing a cause of action before 
actual sale occurred. It is explained that the ‘main consequence of requiring an actual sale 
during the patent term in order to make the offer for sale an act of infringement appears to be 
that the date of infringement will reach back to the date of the original offer.’” (quoting 
Thomas L. Irving & Stacy D. Lewis, Proving a Date of Invention and Infringement After 
GATT/TRIPS, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 309, 351-52. (1994))). 
 39.  Of course, there would be a few (probably very few) cases where an advertisement 
is made and no formal offer follows. Such occurrences would indeed make possible 
additional patent infringement lawsuits under a broader definition of an offer. 
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Yet including advertising in the definition of an offer would likely increase 
patent litigation for at least two reasons. First, making an advertisement an 
infringing act would increase patent litigation because not all advertisements 
lead to offers or sales directed at the United States.40 Theoretically, some 
advertisements will lead to no sales whatsoever (e.g., a completely failed 
advertisement). Other advertisements, especially on the Internet, may be 
directed at numerous countries but only lead to offers or sales in a subset of 
them. If an advertisement is directed at the United States as well as other 
countries, but only leads to formal offers or sales outside of the United States, 
those offers and sales would not infringe a U.S. patent because infringing acts 
must be tied to the country in which the patent was issued.41 
Second, making an advertisement an infringing act would increase patent 
litigation because patent holders can usually learn about advertisements more 
easily than formal offers to sell. Anyone familiar with litigation will recognize 
that learning of infringement is a (sometimes difficult) precondition to bringing 
a suit. Advertisements by definition are sent to a wide audience to engender 
interest in the item advertised. Formal contract-law offers, in contrast, are often 
individualized in nature and may even be confidential, thus making them hard 
to discover. 
Under the current standard, patentees may of course monitor competitors’ 
advertisements, looking for hints of future infringement. But even if the 
patentee finds an advertisement that suggests a formal, infringing offer for sale 
may be forthcoming, the formal offer may be confidential and difficult to 
discover. Thus, including advertisements in the “offer” definition will likely 
lead to more patent litigation.42 When coupled with the ease of advertising on 
(and searching for advertisements on) the Internet, one would expect a sizeable 
increase in patent litigation based on advertisements. 
If defining “offer” to include advertisements indeed increases the amount 
of patent litigation, one may ask whether this is desirable. The answer likely 
depends on one’s view of the patent system. Obviously, those who believe the 
patent system is generally undesirable or unnecessary to provide adequate 
innovation incentives43 will view any accretion in patent rights negatively. 
 
 40.  As discussed infra in Part III, defining “offer” to include advertisements will also 
lead to more litigation because the advertisement may indicate a willingness to sell anywhere 
in the world (including the United States), whereas the eventual offer to sell may be only to 
sell outside of the United States. Part III also discusses that for an offer to sell to infringe a 
U.S. patent, it generally must contemplate an eventual sale inside the United States. 
 41.  See infra Part III. 
 42.  Additionally, under a broader definition of “offer,” patent holders will devote 
additional resources to policing (i.e., searching) for infringing advertisements since the 
search can lead directly to a lawsuit against a competitor. 
 43.  See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The 
Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 849-50 
(1990); Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics 
Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 304 (1989) (“Patents . . . have no place in a regime 
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Similarly, those who argue patent incentives are not a net benefit in certain 
technology areas44 will be averse to stronger patent rights in those fields. 
Likewise, those opining that there is simply too much patent litigation45 might 
oppose broader patent rights that would increase litigation. 
On the other hand, more nuanced criticisms of the patent system are likely 
to have little to say about how broadly courts should define an offer to sell. For 
example, many criticisms focus only on specific aspects of the patent system, 
such as the issuance of “bad” patents (i.e., undeserving under the current legal 
framework),46 forum shopping,47 lawsuits by certain non-practicing entities 
(i.e., patent trolls),48 and the lack of clarity in the law.49 These specific 
 
based on individual rights and are insupportable on either the grounds of (utilitarian) 
efficiency or of a jurisprudence of law and economics.”); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting 
Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms 
Patent (Or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (suggesting that the majority of manufacturing 
industries may not need patents to incentivize innovation). 
 44.  See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the 
Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2001) (noting the inadequacy of current patent 
law practice to software issues); Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case 
Against Software and Business-Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 839-40 
(2003) (arguing against the desirability of business and software patents); Stuart J.H. 
Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 
Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1261 (2009) (finding that patents 
provide technology startups “relatively weak incentives for core activities in the innovation 
process”); Lucas Osborn, Tax Strategy Patents: Why the Tax Community Should Not 
Exclude the Patent System, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 325, 349-79 (2008) (analyzing 
arguments for and against tax strategy patents and business method patents). 
 45.  See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 140-42, 145-46 (2000) (discussing perceived problems and 
possible solutions to current patent litigation practices). 
 46.  See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 766 (2002) (discussing proposals to improve patent quality); 
Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 43, 43 (2010) (“[T]here are ‘bad’ patents everywhere.”); Mark A. Lemley, 
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (2001); Mark 
Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION, 
Winter 2005, at 10. 
 47.  See, e.g., La Belle, supra note 46, passim (arguing that the inability for many 
accused infringers to bring declaratory relief actions in convenient and friendly forums 
significantly hinders the patent system from combating the issue of bad patents); Kimberly 
A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 
79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 933-37 (2001) (suggesting limiting venue by statute to decrease 
transaction costs incurred defending in inconvenient forums, thereby increasing certainty and 
predictability for parties). 
 48.  See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent 
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 329-30 (2010); 
Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1-2 
(2012); Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent 
Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 160-61 (2006). 
 49.  See, e.g., Timothy J. Le Duc, Apples Are Not Common Sense in View of Oranges: 
Time to Reform KSR’s Illusory Obviousness Standard?, 21 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. 
 
Winter 2013] RIPPLE EFFECTS IN THE LAW 559 
criticisms, even if accurate, should not necessarily influence whether 
advertisements should count as offers under § 271(a). Rather, specific 
criticisms are best met by solutions specifically tailored to the problem, rather 
than by making broad changes that unnecessarily affect areas not tainted by the 
specific criticism.50 
This Part has considered some of the most obvious effects of broadening 
the definition of an offer. In the remaining Parts, this Article considers some of 
the less obvious effects, beginning with the potential for a vast increase in the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law. 
III. RIPPLE EFFECTS: A BROADER DEFINITION OF “OFFER” WOULD LEAD TO 
MORE EXTRATERRITORIAL INFRINGEMENT SUITS 
A less obvious effect of enlarging the scope of an offer to include 
advertisements concerns the potential for U.S. patent law to apply to acts 
performed outside of the United States. Patent law’s territorial nature dictates 
that, in general, a person is only liable for infringement of a U.S. patent when 
the person performs infringing acts “within the United States.”51 Thus, if a 
company makes an infringing device but only makes it in Mexico, the U.S. 
patent holder has no power to sue the company in the United States.52 
Applying this territorial concept to infringement for an offer to sell raises 
the question of what must occur within the United States: the offer only (i.e., an 
offer made in the United States to sell in another country)? Or the effect of the 
 
PROP. L. 49, 49-50 (2010) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s approach to obviousness); Peter 
S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 715 (2010) (noting that “scholars roundly criticize the 
jurisprudence of claim construction for lacking theoretical or practical coherence”); Kristen 
Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087, 1092 
(2007) (“[T]he question of subject-matter eligibility for any invention is essentially pro 
forma, and whether a patent is granted . . . should be based on the application meeting the 
requirements of patentability provided by 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112.”); Michael Risch, 
Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 658 (2008) (“[T]he PTO and courts should 
focus on answering specific questions about how to best apply rigorous standards of novelty, 
nonobviousness, utility, and specification with a scalpel rather than simply eliminating broad 
swaths of innovation with a machete.”).  
 50.  There are exceptions to this statement. One might change a law that is general in 
application because the benefit of the effect on the “problem area” (e.g., patent trolls) 
outweighs any detriment in the non-problem area (i.e., all other patents). Because the 
number of cases concerning infringement for offering to sell is relatively small compared to 
the vast total of patent infringement actions, and because it does not appear that infringement 
for offering to sell disproportionately involves specific problem areas of patent law, it is not 
obvious that the scope of an offer in patent law should depend on any such problem area. 
 51.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). For a more robust discussion of the law’s territorial 
nature, see infra notes 74-78. 
 52.  Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 
617 F.3d 1296, 1308-10 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Of course, someone having the Mexican patent 
could sue the company in Mexico. 
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offer, which would be felt where the advertisement contemplated the future 
sales would occur (i.e., an offer made in another country to sell in the United 
States)? Both the offer and the effect? In Transocean, the Federal Circuit 
answered this question by holding that the “focus should not be on the location 
of the offer, but rather the location of the future sale that would occur pursuant 
to the offer. . . . [T]he location of the contemplated sale controls whether there 
is an offer to sell within the United States.”53 Under its broadest interpretation, 
Transocean means that regardless of whether the offeror is located in the 
United States—and regardless of whether the offer was made in the United 
States—as long as the contemplated sale would occur in the United States, the 
offer can constitute infringement. 
Extending the Transocean “contemplated sale” test to a broadened 
definition of an offer would create a scenario in which foreign entities could be 
liable for patent infringement for advertising infringing technology, regardless 
of where in the entire world they made the advertisements.54 Just as the offer in 
Transocean constituted infringement even though it was made in Norway,55 an 
advertisement made in a newspaper in China or Germany might constitute 
infringement of a U.S. patent if it contemplated a future sale in the United 
States! A moment’s reflection should reveal that this could lead to a huge 
increase in claims of patent infringement against foreign entities and activities 
depending on how courts extend the Transocean case to advertisements. 
But extending Transocean’s “contemplated sale” test to advertisements 
raises difficulties: do advertisements “contemplate” a location for future sales? 
While contract-law offers to sell must be relatively formal and thus likely to 
identify a specific location for the contemplated sale, advertisements often do 
not explicitly specify a location of contemplated sales. Indeed, advertisements, 
which by definition are broadcast to a wide audience, may “contemplate” (or at 
least hope for) future sales in many locations.56 
Imagine that a company holds a U.S. patent on a certain widget and that the 
widget is not patented in any other country. A German competitor could thus 
make, use, and sell the widget in Germany without infringing the U.S. patent. 
But what if the German competitor ran an advertisement promoting the widget? 
When will such an advertisement “contemplate” a future sale in the United 
States? Does the answer change depending on whether the advertisement 
 
 53.  Id. at 1309. 
 54.  Recall the caveat that in the actual Transocean case, the accused infringer was a 
U.S. company making an offer while in a foreign country. Supra note 31 and accompanying 
text. The court did not explicitly rely on the fact that the company was based in the United 
States, but it may be grounds for future cases to limit the holding. See Transocean, 617 F.3d 
at 1309 (“This case presents the question whether an offer which is made in Norway by a 
U.S. company to a U.S. company to sell a product within the U.S., for delivery and use 
within the U.S. constitutes an offer to sell within the U.S. under § 271(a).”). 
 55.  Id. at 1308-09. 
 56.  This discussion uses the term “advertisements,” but analogies to other promotional 
activities, which might be less widespread or less formal, are readily possible.  
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appeared only in a German magazine? In a U.S. magazine? On the Internet, but 
only in the German language? On the Internet, in both German and English? 
A. Possible Tests for Whether an Advertisement “Contemplates” a Future 
Sale in the United States 
In applying Transocean’s “contemplated sale” test to advertisements, it 
must be emphasized that “contemplation” does not necessarily require intent 
for or awareness of eventual sales in the United States. The harm caused by 
advertisements, price erosion,57 occurs regardless of the advertising party’s 
intent or awareness. The contemplation test’s purpose in the context of 
advertisements is to discern whether the advertisement will likely cause price 
erosion.58 Rather than focusing on the advertiser’s intent, the law must rely on 
surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether an advertisement contemplated 
a future sale in the United States. The following Subparts consider a few 
potential tests for whether an advertisement contemplates a future sale in the 
United States and recommends which test to adopt. 
1. The Text Test 
The law could presume that advertisements do not specifically contemplate 
sales in any country, and therefore do not infringe in any country, unless the 
text of the advertisement specifies the location(s) of the future sales. The main 
benefit of a text-based test is clarity; one simply reads or listens to the words of 
the advertisement to discern if the United States is mentioned as a place for 
future sales. 
On the other hand, the test is arbitrary and would be easy for would-be 
infringers to get around. Common experience shows that most advertisements 
do not specifically state the location of future sales. A would-be infringer could 
avoid infringement by simply not mentioning the United States, while being 
free to use context and innuendo to make clear that he contemplates sales to the 
United States. Such a formalistic test would therefore reduce the number of 
advertisements that infringe, assuming the advertisers adapt to the law. 
 
 57.  Price erosion refers to the downward price pressure on patented goods when a 
competitor signals to the market that it will offer a competing (often infringing) good, since 
the market expects the patentee to lower its price to compete with the infringer. See, e.g., 
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1308 (citing Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 4, at 791-92). 
For additional discussion of price erosion, see infra notes 137-141 and accompanying text. 
 58.  See sources cited infra note 139 for the proposition that price erosion can be 
difficult to prove with certainty and may not always occur even with formal, contract-law 
offers to sell. Rather than forcing a plaintiff to prove price erosion early in litigation, the 
contemplation test serves as a proxy for whether price erosion is likely to have occurred. The 
plaintiff will prove the amount of price erosion, if any, at a later stage in the litigation.  
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2. The Origination Test 
As a second test, the law could presume that an advertisement only 
contemplates future sales in the country in which it originates, unless the 
content of the advertisement specifically includes or excludes the United States 
as a location for future sales.59 As used here, an advertisement “originates” 
from the country in which it is developed. For print advertisements, an 
advertisement is often printed where it is developed. In the Internet context, the 
place where the advertisement originates is less clear because the advertisement 
will most likely be instantly accessible worldwide, but may be hosted on a 
server anywhere in the world. For simplicity, an Internet advertisement could 
be deemed to originate in the country from which the would-be infringer 
directed the advertisement’s launch. 
An origination test has some clarity, but it is exceedingly arbitrary because 
the location from which the advertisement originates may bear little 
relationship to where the impact of the advertisement will be felt or where the 
future sales are likely to occur. If a magazine with the advertisement is printed 
in Mexico, but all the magazines are shipped to the United States, the primary 
impact of the advertisement will almost certainly be in the United States. The 
test may also be easy to evade: a would-be infringer could simply orchestrate 
initial publication in a country where the technology is not patented. Indeed, an 
origination test would directly contravene the Transocean court’s emphasis on 
the location of the contemplated sale, not the location of the offer. 
3. The Appearance Test 
The law could presume that an advertisement only contemplates future 
sales in the country/countries in which the advertisement appears, unless the 
content of the advertisement specifically includes or excludes the United States 
as a location for future sales. For example, if a magazine intended for U.S. 
distribution contains an advertisement of infringing technology and is actually 
distributed in the United States, the advertiser would be liable for infringement. 
Generally, the appearance test is likely to be a decent proxy for where the 
future sales are contemplated (excluding some website-based advertisements), 
since a company will generally strive to direct advertisements to its intended 
customers. This is especially true for print, radio, and television advertisements 
that often must specifically be directed to each country in which it appears. 
At least one caveat must be included even with print, radio, and television 
advertisements: de minimus and accidental appearances in a country should not 
make the competitor liable. For example, it is possible for a magazine that is 
 
 59.  The latter part of the proposed test (relating to the text of the advertisement) could 
be dropped, but fairness suggests leaving it in. If an advertisement specifically includes or 
excludes the United States, liability for infringement based on the advertisement should take 
account of the revealed intent, unless it is shown to be a sham to avoid liability. 
Winter 2013] RIPPLE EFFECTS IN THE LAW 563 
sold only in China to be carried by an individual to the United States, or for a 
second-hand distributor to resell a few of the Chinese magazines in the United 
States, but this sort of minimal migration should not count as an “appearance” 
in the United States. 
As with so many areas of the law, special attention must be given to 
internet-based advertisements. Some internet-based advertisements—such as 
banner and pop-up advertisements—may be specifically directed to a given 
country.60 On the other hand, when a competitor advertises its technology via 
the text/media on its own web page, the appearance test may be less useful as a 
proxy for the advertiser’s intent. This is because web pages automatically 
“appear” across the globe. 
Internet domain names,61 particularly top-level domains (“TLDs”) (such as 
.edu, .com, or .it),62 may give clues regarding where the web page is directed.63 
Some TLDs, such as .com, .net, and .org, are generic and may not tell much 
about geotargeting, but others (called country code TLDs, or “ccTLDs”) are 
country specific, such as .de (Germany) and .jp (Japan).64 
If an Italian company advertises on its company website on the .it domain 
and in the Italian language, it strongly suggests that no harm will occur in the 
United States,65 even though a U.S.-based user could most likely access the 
website by typing the web address directly into a browser. On the other hand, 
especially for generic TLDs, it is improvident to assume that because websites 
appear everywhere, they therefore are targeted nowhere.66 Website owners are 
 
 60.  See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125-126 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(describing Google’s search results and its AdWords and Keyword Suggestion Tool 
programs); John Mueller, Working with Multi-regional Websites, GOOGLE WEBMASTER 
CENTRAL BLOG (Mar. 12, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com 
/2010/03/working-with-multi-regional-websites.html (discussing Google’s ability to use 
geotargeting factors). 
 61.  Internet domain names are the alphanumeric characters that appear after the two 
slashes in a World Wide Web address, e.g., http://law.campbell.edu. 
 62.  In the address law.campbell.edu, the “.edu” is the top-level domain and 
“campbell” is the second-level domain. A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: 
Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 39 (2000). 
 63.  See Mueller, supra note 60.  
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See id. (“Users and search engines use [ccTLDs] as a strong sign that your website 
is explicitly for a certain country. . . . Other signals can give us hints. This could be from 
local addresses & phone numbers on the pages, use of local language and currency . . . . ”). 
 66.  Commentators have highlighted the logical flaw in reasoning that because the 
Internet is ubiquitous, it is targeted nowhere. See, e.g., Sarah H. Ludington, Aiming at the 
Wrong Target: The “Audience Targeting” Test for Personal Jurisdiction in Internet 
Defamation Cases, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 541, 559 (2012) (noting in the defamation context that 
Internet publications are not directed “nowhere” and that publishers “use the medium 
precisely because of its scope”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: 
Returning to Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 71, 88 (“A primary flaw of the prevailing approach is its rejection of the ubiquitous 
nature of Internet activity in favor of a fictitious presumption that Internet activity is targeted 
 
564 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:549 
often happy to have their sites available as widely as possible. In addition, 
although it can be expensive and imperfect, at least some website owners can 
take advantage of technology to limit the countries in which the website 
appears.67 Given these concerns, the law should consider a more nuanced test 
than the appearance test. 
4. The Total Context Test 
In a complex, interconnected world, the law would do best by eschewing 
the above relatively simple tests. Instead, the law should determine where an 
advertisement contemplates future sales based on the entire context 
surrounding the advertisement. Such a test would consider the factors discussed 
in the previous proposed tests, as well as others. Factors would include: 
 whether the content of the advertisement specifies or excludes 
future sales to the United States; 
 the type of media used (print, television, internet banner ads, 
internet web pages, etc.); 
 where the advertisement originated; 
 the citizenship and/or physical location(s) of the entity making the 
advertisement;68 
 where the advertisement appeared, including 
o the number of appearances in the United States, including 
number of U.S. views of a webpage; 
o the internet domain in which a website appears (e.g., .it 
for Italy, versus .com);69 
o the use, or lack of, geo-location filters to direct or exclude 
internet web page advertisements to or from the United 
States;70 
 the language (English versus non-English) and currency (U.S. 
dollars versus other currency) used in the advertisement;71 and 
 
nowhere.”). 
 67.  Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: The 
Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 61, 66-78 (2011) (describing the technology that companies can, among other things, 
use to limit where their websites appear); Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-location 
Technologies and Other Means of Placing Borders on the ‘Borderless’ Internet, 23 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 101, 107-120 (2004) (noting same). 
 68.  By “entity making the advertisement” I mean the company that intends to 
commercialize the allegedly infringing technology, not any third party intermediaries 
(advertising firms, Internet service providers, magazine companies, etc.) that might assist in 
creating or distributing the advertisement. For more on third-party intermediary liability, see 
infra Subpart V.A. 
 69.  See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. 
 70.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 71.  Some of these factors are the same or analogous to factors used in cases deciding 
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 the intent of the accused infringer who made the advertisement.72 
Under the total context test, a court should balance the above factors, and 
any other relevant facts, to ascertain whether the advertisement contemplates 
future sales in the United States. As stated, the test is an objective, not 
subjective one: courts should not be concerned with the actual intent of the 
parties. Rather, the goal of the test is to predict when harm from price-erosion 
is likely in the United States. Bright lines will be impossible to draw and courts 
will need to analyze the issue on a case-by-case basis. If the advertisement 
contemplates future sales in the United States, it should be actionable as 
infringement because it could harm the U.S. patent holder via price erosion in 
the United States. 
Thus, infringing advertisements could include those made from within the 
United States73 and those originating abroad, as long as they contemplate an 
eventual sale within the United States. The possibility that non-U.S. actors 
might be liable for acts committed outside of the United States should raise 
caution lest the extraterritorial application of U.S. law expands too greatly. The 
next Subpart discusses the concerns of extraterritorial application of U.S. patent 
law. 
B. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Patent Law Based on 
Advertisements of Infringing Technology 
Using the total context test (discussed in the immediately preceding 
Subpart) to determine whether an advertisement contemplates future sales in 
the United States would sometimes lead courts to hold actors guilty of 
infringing U.S. patents even though the actions occurred outside of the United 
States. Even if an advertisement appears only in Germany, for instance, it may 
clearly contemplate future sales in the United States and thus be actionable. 
Further, given the global nature of the Internet, Internet advertisements will 
often appear in the United States and may contemplate future sales in the 
United States. 
These and other scenarios may violate the U.S. legal system’s presumption 
 
whether personal jurisdiction exists in Internet-based tort lawsuits. See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, 
Inc., v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting, among other facts, that the 
defendant’s “web sites are entirely in Spanish; prices for its merchandise are in pesetas or 
Euros, and merchandise can be shipped only to addresses within Spain”). 
 72.  While the test is an objective test and intent should not control, the intent of the 
advertising party can help inform whether the advertisement is likely to cause price erosion. 
After all, if the accused infringer intended to sell into the United States, this suggests that 
price erosion in the United States is more likely. 
 73.  Recall that the Transocean court’s focus on the eventual sale rather than the 
location of the offer means that even if an advertisement is made in the United States, it 
would not be actionable as infringement unless it contemplated an eventual sale in the 
United States. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors 
USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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that the laws of the United States do not apply extraterritorially.74 The 
presumption against extraterritoriality is a cannon of statutory construction with 
a long history, although the presumption’s strength has varied over time.75 The 
presumption is rooted in theories about international relationships and 
congressional intent,76 though some have questioned whether courts should 
continue to recognize the presumption.77 
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently invigorated the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. Indeed, just three years before the 
Transocean decision, the Supreme Court declared that the presumption “applies 
with particular force in patent law.”78 The Supreme Court’s warning did not, 
however, appear to impress the Transocean panel of judges. The Transocean 
court cited the Microsoft case and noted that it was “mindful of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality,” but proceeded to use broad language in 
the opinion that portends significant extraterritorial application79 unless the 
case is limited to its facts.80 
The Transocean decision may not be the rebellion against Supreme Court 
authority that it initially appears. The legal system has varying views about the 
 
 74.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Intellectual 
Property Law: Principal Paper: Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of 
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 510-13 (1997); William S. Dodge, Understanding the 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 91-112 (1998). 
 75.  Bradley, supra note 74, at 507, 510-13. In the copyright context, which is often 
considered analogous to the patent context, the Supreme Court has recently expanded the 
extraterritorial reach of copyright law. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
1351, 1355-56 (2013) (holding that the first sale doctrine extinguishes the U.S. copyright 
holder’s right to prevent importation of a copy lawfully made outside of the United States). 
 76.  Bradley, supra note 74, at 513-16 (discussing five justifications for the 
presumption: international law, international comity, choice-of-law principles, likely 
congressional intent, and separation-of-powers considerations). 
 77.  See, e.g., Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 
24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 1-2 (1992); Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational 
Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 600-02 
(1990). 
 78.  Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007). Note that the 
Kirtsaeng case, discussed supra note 75, may by analogy portend an increase in the 
extraterritorial application of patent law. On the other hand, after Kirtsaeng, the Supreme 
Court applied a strong presumption against extraterritorial effects of the Alien Tort Statute. 
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664-69 (2013) (holding that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the Alien Tort Statute, and that 
nothing in the statute rebuts the presumption); see also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 
130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application, it has none.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Should Foreign Patent Law Matter?, 34 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 581, 597-607 (2012) (discussing the limits of extraterritoriality). 
 79. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 
617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating that “the location of the contemplated sale 
controls whether there is an offer to sell within the United States”).  
 80.  The companies in Transocean were U.S., not foreign, companies. See id.; see also 
Holbrook, Transocean, supra note 4, at 1117-18. 
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meaning of the presumption against extraterritoriality, which stem in part from 
the ability to distinguish between the location of conduct and the location of the 
effects of the conduct.81 Professor Dodge outlines three possibilities for the 
meaning: 
First the presumption might mean that acts of Congress should apply only to 
conduct that occurs within the United States, unless a contrary intent appears, 
regardless of whether that conduct causes effects in the United States . . . . 
Second, the presumption might mean that acts of Congress apply only to 
conduct that causes effects within the United States, unless a contrary intent 
appears, regardless of where that conduct occurs . . . . Third, the presumption 
might mean that acts of Congress apply to conduct occurring within or having 
an effect within the United States, unless a contrary intent appears.82 
While the Transocean court did not squarely address the extraterritoriality 
issue, the court’s focus on the effects of the offer to the exclusion of the 
location of the offer demonstrates the court’s affinity for the second meaning 
listed by Professor Dodge.83 
The purpose of this Subpart of the Article is not to attack or defend the 
Transocean court’s potentially broad holding. Rather, having shown that 
extending the holding to advertisements might likewise have significant 
extraterritorial effects, the remaining Subparts discuss how to limit those 
effects. 
Two areas of law may limit (but by no means extinguish) the 
extraterritorial impact of U.S. patent law based on advertisements of infringing 
technology. First, the above-described “total context test” for determining when 
an advertisement contemplates future sales in the United States will limit 
lawsuits to those very likely to have an effect in the United States. Second, the 
principles of personal jurisdiction will further screen out unfair applications of 
U.S. patent law to foreign actors. 
1. The Total Context Test for Advertisements Limits the Unfair 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Patent Law 
The total context test, described in Subpart III.A.4 above, determines 
whether an advertisement contemplates future sales in the United States and 
thus whether it is actionable as infringement under an expanded definition of an 
offer to sell. A well-applied test will ensure that judicial interpretation of patent 
law’s offer to sell provision is consistent with the view that U.S. laws may 
 
 81.  Dodge, supra note 74, at 87-88. 
 82.  Id. at 88-89 (emphasis added); see also Bradley, supra note 74, at 517 (“[T]here is 
now substantial agreement that nations may, under certain circumstances, regulate 
extraterritorial conduct that has effects within their territory.”).  
 83.  See Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309 (“These acts create a real harm in the U.S. to a 
U.S. patentee.”); Holbrook, Transocean, supra note 4, at 1104 (“In essence, the Transocean 
rule is a form of an effects-based test, where the exercise of U.S. law is justified because the 
act—the offer—will have effects within the United States.”). 
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control foreign conduct that causes effects within the United States. Hence, the 
total context test’s factors are designed to predict whether the advertisement is 
likely to cause price erosion in the United States.84 
For example, if an advertisement specifies future sales to the United States, 
this is a strong indication that price erosion may occur in the United States. 
Similarly, if an advertisement makes clear that no sales will be made to the 
United States, price erosion in the United States is highly unlikely, unless the 
disclaimer is a sham and everyone knows it. 
In addition, an English-language advertisement made by a U.S. company 
on its internet web page suggests (absent additional facts) it contemplates sales 
in the United States. Contrast that with a German-language advertisement made 
by a German company on its internet web page using the “.de” ccTLD, which 
suggests it contemplates sales in Germany. Absent additional facts, the German 
advertisement is unlikely to cause price erosion in the United States, and thus 
should not be actionable in the United States. Add an additional fact, however, 
that the advertisement specifically mentions that sales will be to the United 
States, and of course the analysis changes to predict effects in the United 
States. 
These short examples demonstrate the total context test’s role in limiting 
the extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law. Under an effects-based 
understanding of the law, an advertisement that will likely cause price erosion 
in the United States should be actionable in U.S. courts. 
The total context test’s role is not limited to validating a statutory 
construction that permits application of U.S. law to foreign actors. In addition, 
the test ensures that U.S. patent law—specifically § 271(a)’s offer to sell 
provision—comports with the requirements of the U.S. Constitution. Although 
the law continues to evolve in this area, courts and commentators increasingly 
understand that at least the Fifth Amendment85 and the Foreign Commerce 
Clause86 provide substantive constraints on the extraterritorial application of 
 
 84.  Of course, whether price erosion actually occurs will depend on market conditions, 
including the availability of non-infringing substitutes, see infra note 138, but the total 
context test does not seek to prove that price erosion actually occurred, only that the 
advertisement likely would have caused it assuming the additional market conditions exist. 
The patent holder would have to prove that price erosion actually occurred in the damages 
phase. 
 85.  Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment 
Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1223 (1992) (“When the Supreme Court finally does 
address this question, we believe the proper answer is clear: the Fifth Amendment limits 
extraterritorial application of substantive federal law.”) (emphasis in original); Willis L. M. 
Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1587-88 (1978). But see A. Mark 
Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 384-417 (1997) (arguing that due process does not limit the territorial 
reach of federal law). 
 86.  Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: 
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 
146-51 (2007) (discussing the Foreign Commerce Clause in the context of laws concerning 
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U.S. laws.87 By tying liability under § 271(a)’s offer-to-sell provision to the 
cases where U.S. patent holders will likely feel significant effects, the total 
context test brings § 271(a)’s extraterritorial applications within the 
Constitution’s boundaries. 
Besides corralling the reach of the total context test, the Constitution 
provides another important limitation on potentially unfair applications of U.S. 
laws to foreign actors: namely, the requirement that U.S. courts have personal 
jurisdiction over defendants. The next Subpart explores this limitation. 
2. The Requirement of Personal Jurisdiction Limits the Unfair 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Patent Law 
In addition to the substantive Constitutional constraints placed on laws 
having extraterritorial effects, the Constitution also collaterally limits 
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws via the requirement of personal 
jurisdiction. The purpose of this Subpart is not to provide a full exposition of 
the expansive and somewhat murky law regarding personal jurisdiction, but 
rather to highlight the ways in which the modern doctrine can limit the 
instances of unfair applications of U.S. laws to foreign defendants. 
a. Personal Jurisdiction Basics 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution to place limits on a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.88 In 
the twentieth century, personal jurisdiction doctrine shifted from a view that 
required the defendant’s presence within geographical boundaries89 to one that 
emphasized reasonableness and fairness.90 The Supreme Court’s opinion in 
 
terrorism) [hereinafter, Colangelo, Terrorism]; Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign 
Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 951-58 (2010) (describing limits on extraterritorial 
application of U.S. laws imposed by the foreign commerce clause); Eugene Kontorovich, 
Beyond the Article I Horizon, Congress’s Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction 
Over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1248-51 (2009) (discussing the Foreign 
Commerce Clause in the criminal law context).  
 87.  Note that different aspects of the Constitution regulate the ability of states within 
the United States to regulate conduct outside their state borders, particularly the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Colangelo, Terrorism, supra note 
86, at 146-47 (comparing the Foreign and “Domestic” commerce clauses), 159 (comparing 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).  
 88.  See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011). 
Where Federal law (such as patent law), as opposed to state law applies to a cause of action, 
there is some confusion as to whether the Due Process Clause is that of the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 
1355, 1358 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Federal Circuit has stated that the issue is “purely 
academic” because it applies the same test regardless which Amendment applies. Id.  
 89.  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (“The authority of every tribunal is 
necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”). 
 90.  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-85 (1985); Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
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International Shoe Co. v. Washington91 focused the test of personal jurisdiction 
around two concepts: first, the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, and 
second, fairness.92 
Courts distinguish between the concepts of “general personal jurisdiction” 
and “specific personal jurisdiction.”93 General personal jurisdiction in a forum 
exists over a defendant whose activities in the forum are “continuous and 
systematic” such that they may be considered “essentially at home in the 
forum.”94 An example would be an individual’s domicile or a business’s place 
of incorporation and principal place of business.95 When a defendant is subject 
to general personal jurisdiction in a forum, the forum has personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant even where the actions giving rise to the lawsuit are wholly 
unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.96 
When the defendant’s contacts are too sparse to create general personal 
jurisdiction, a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction if the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum state nonetheless meets a certain threshold 
and the claims at issue “arise out of or are connected with” those contacts.97 To 
justify this “specific” personal jurisdiction, the defendant’s claim-related 
contacts must demonstrate that it “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws.”98 
One subtest for specific personal jurisdiction based on a specific fact 
pattern bears mention. In the intentional tort context, courts have found specific 
personal jurisdiction based on the effects of an intentional tort committed by a 
defendant who “expressly aimed” the tortuous conduct at the forum and the 
plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum.99 Patent infringement is a 
tort,100 and thus such tests may have some applicability where the patent 
 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 91.  326 U.S. 310. 
 92.  Id. at 316 (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain 
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”) (citations omitted). 
 93.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853-54 (2011). 
 94.  Id. at 2851.  
 95.  Id. at 2853-54. 
 96.  Id. at 2854. 
 97.  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787-88 (2011). 
 98.  Id. The Federal Circuit’s application of Supreme Court law has led to a three-part 
test for whether specific personal jurisdiction exists: (1) the defendant “purposefully 
directed” its activities at residents of the forum state; (2) the claim “arises out of or relates to 
those activities;” and (3) personal jurisdiction can be fairly exercised while still comporting 
with “fair play and substantial justice.” Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1545-46 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-77 (1985)). 
 99.  See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984); Ludington, supra note 66, at 
344. 
 100.  Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 169 (1894) (“The transaction as stated 
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infringement is intentional. But whether or not patent infringement is an 
intentional tort is the subject of some confusion.101 Perhaps this is because a 
plaintiff need not show the defendant intended to infringe,102 but a plaintiff 
may obtain enhanced damages if he can show the infringement was “willful,” 
which is somewhat like “intentional.”103 Where the patent infringement based 
on an advertisement is intentional, courts might find specific personal 
jurisdiction based on a Calder-like effects test. This would include cases where 
the U.S. patent holder felt the brunt of the harm in the United States and where 
the infringer expressly aimed the advertisement at the United States. Indeed, 
such a personal jurisdiction test mirrors some of the factors of the total context 
test. 
Even where a defendant interacts with a forum extensively enough to meet 
the “contacts” requirement of jurisdiction, the court must also find that 
exercising jurisdiction is fair.104 Factors for this murky analysis include the 
burden on the defendant of litigating in the forum, the interests of the forum 
State, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief.105 Where the case involves 
a non-U.S. defendant, the analysis should also include considerations of the 
policies of other nations and the Federal Government’s interest in its foreign 
relations policies.106 
Though the intricacies of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence are winding 
and unsettled, the upshot is that a non-U.S. defendant will not be subject to 
jurisdiction in the United States unless it has certain minimum contacts with the 
United States and the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair.107 Personal 
 
in the petition . . . was a tort pure and simple.”). 
 101.  Compare Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., LLP, 329 F.3d 923, 931 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (“Copyright infringement unlike patent infringement is an intentional tort . . . ”), 
with Monsanto Co. v. Trantham (In re Trantham), 304 B.R. 298, 307 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2004) 
(stating in the bankruptcy context that patent infringement “has historically been viewed” as 
an intentional tort).  
 102.  Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1523 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc) (“Intent becomes a requirement only if and when the patent owner seeks 
enhanced damages or attorneys fees for willful infringement . . . .”). 
 103.  Willful infringement contains separate objective and subjective inquiries. In re 
Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Under the objective inquiry, “a 
patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an 
objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent . . . . 
The state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry.” Id. at 
1371. If the objective inquiry is met, “the patentee must also demonstrate that this 
objectively-defined risk . . . was either known or so obvious that it should have been known 
to the accused infringer.” Id. 
 104.  See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011).  
 105.  Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987). 
 106.  Id. at 115; see also Donald Earl Childress III, Rethinking Legal Globalization: The 
Case of Transnational Personal Jurisdiction, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1518-25 
(2013) (analyzing transnational personal jurisdiction).  
 107.  J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2787. It should be noted that even when 
jurisdiction is authorized, a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction under the 
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jurisdiction jurisprudence thus works alongside the proposed total context test 
for advertisements to safeguard against unfair applications of U.S. law against 
foreign actors.108 Considering both tests, then, there are three scenarios where a 
patent infringement claim based on an advertisement would not be litigated in 
the United States: (1) where the advertisement fails the total context test and 
the defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction anywhere in the United 
States; (2) where the advertisement fails the total context test even though the 
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction somewhere in the United States; 
and (3) where the advertisement meets the total context test but the defendant is 
not subject to personal jurisdiction anywhere in the United States. 
Thus, for example, even where a foreign defendant is subject to general 
personal jurisdiction based on extensive contacts with the United States, if the 
advertisement fails the total context test, the defendant will not need to litigate 
in the United States. Only when a claim for patent infringement satisfies both 
the total context test and personal jurisdiction requirements will the foreign 
defendant be forced to litigate in the United States.109 
C. Conclusion 
This Part demonstrates how a seemingly small change in the law (a broader 
definition of an offer in § 271(a)) can interact with other changes in the law 
(the Transocean decision) to produce far-ranging consequences. Permitting so 
many potential causes of action based on foreign activities might suggest that a 
broader definition of an offer is a bad idea. Rather than abandon the broader 
definition, however, courts instead must carefully craft a test for when an 
advertisement of infringing technology will be actionable in the United States. 
In addition, courts can rely on personal jurisdiction doctrine to protect many 
foreign actors from unfair applications of U.S. law. 
Those who would compete with patent holders must structure their 
advertisements appropriately to avoid harming the U.S. patent holder. For 
advertisements that do contemplate an eventual sale in the United States, 
allowing a suit for patent infringement will often be fair: a person should often 
be held liable for attempting to generate commercial interest in infringing 
 
doctrine of forum non conveniens if the action can be brought in another forum. Sinochem 
Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 423 (2007). To simplify the 
analysis, this article does not address forum non conveniens, but it would provide an 
additional check against unfairness for a foreign litigant. See Childress, supra note 106, at 
1528-43 (analyzing transnational forum non conveniens); Christopher A. Whytock & 
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1452-62 (2011) (same). 
 108.  See Childress, supra note 106, at 1525-28 (describing how both personal 
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens work as a proxy for choice of law). 
 109.  Of course, the claim will have to cross additional hurdles, including that the patent 
is valid and infringed, that venue exists, and that the court should not exercise its 
discretionary power based on forum non conveniens. 
Winter 2013] RIPPLE EFFECTS IN THE LAW 573 
technology when it harms the patent holder in the United States.110 
IV. MORE EFFECTS: UNCERTAINTY (AND HOW TO MINIMIZE IT) 
As discussed above in Part II, defining the term “offer” to include 
advertisements and similar commercializing activities would cause competitors 
to face more infringement suits, and those suits would occur at an earlier point 
in time. In addition, the broadened definition of an offer may have unintended 
consequences if competitors are unable to ascertain what activities constitute 
“advertisements and other promotions.” Businesses prefer certainty and if they 
are unable to determine which activities will avoid infringement, they may err 
on the side of caution, thus foregoing beneficial economic activity.111 
A. Changing the “Offer” Definition Risks Creating Uncertainty; Clearer 
Rules Lessen the Impact 
The risk that broadening the definition of an infringing offer may result in 
uncertainty does not necessarily mean that lawmakers should simply maintain 
the current suboptimal definition.112 Rather, the preferred solution should be to 
make the new definition as clear as possible. That is, courts should strive to 
make the test more rule-like, rather than standard-like. 
1. Rules Are Theoretically Preferable to Standards 
In the context of a test’s clarity, room exists for a variety of tests falling 
along the familiar spectrum of rules versus standards. Scholars have analyzed 
rules and standards extensively113 and recent literature has explored rules 
 
 110.  Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 174-76. 
 111.  See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the 
Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 303-06 (1984); Troy A. Paredes, A Systems 
Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the 
Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1133-34 (2004) (stating that certainty in law “is a 
valuable asset that facilitates business and investing”). But see Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, 
Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse 
Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1000-01 (1999) 
(suggesting that uncertainty regarding patent law remedies may reduce the deadweight losses 
involved with patents). 
 112.  See Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
419, 461 (2012) [hereinafter Osborn, Instrumentalism] (discussing the difference between a 
precise test (i.e., reproducible) versus an accurate test (i.e., gives the “correct” answer)). 
 113.  See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE 
L.J. 65 (1983); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22-29 
(1967); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and 
the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form 
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Carol M. Rose, 
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versus standards in relation to patent law.114 A familiar example of a rule is a 
speed limit of “55 miles per hour,” while a familiar corresponding standard is 
“drive at a reasonable speed.” 
Supporters of rules laud their ability to facilitate efficient allocation by 
providing ex ante certainty.115 Certainty allows businesses to maximize their 
opportunities for economic advancement by organizing their activities around 
whatever legal test is adopted, even if it is imperfect.116 Rule-like tests permit 
businesses to conduct their operations with precision, giving them clear signals 
about permissible behavior. To the extent that businesses perceive economic 
advantage by engineering their activities to approach the bright-line edge of the 
rule, companies will do so. 
On the other hand, standard-like tests are flexible, which might have ex 
post benefits associated with fairness and pragmatism.117 But that same 
flexibility generally yields less predictable results because standards may invite 
inconsistent judicial application118 and leave parties uncertain ex ante as to 
permissible behavior.119 Hence, parties may forego permissible activity in an 
effort to avoid the risk of incurring liability. 
Since businesses desire certainty, lawmakers should strive for it in defining 
what sort of offer will infringe. An unclear definition would allow patent 
holders to threaten litigation against activity that probably does not fall within 
the definition of an offer. Such uncertainty and threats of litigation will lead to 
under-investment by competitors who will likely prefer to err on the side of 
caution (e.g., avoid activities that are close to, but not included in, the definition 
of an offer to sell) rather than risk exposure to infringement liability.120 As a 
 
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); Justice Antonin Scalia, 
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 
(1995).  
 114.  See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 611 (2009); Osborn, Instrumentalism, supra note 112, at 424, 
461; John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003). 
 115.  See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 111, at 312-14; Kaplow, supra note 113, at 
575-76.  
 116.  See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more 
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”), overruled in 
part by Helvering v. Mountain Prods. Corp., 58 S. Ct. 623 (1938).  
 117.  See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 113, at 11-13 (criticizing the ex post 
considerations of standards and preferring to focus on the position of the parties before the 
dispute or deal); Rose, supra note 113, at 591-93.  
 118.  See Kaplow, supra note 113, at 587-88. 
 119.  See, e.g., Rose, supra note 113, at 591. 
 120.  Infringement results in damages of lost profits, or at a minimum, a reasonable 
royalty. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the 
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”). The court has 
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result, the market will receive less technology and competition than if 
uncertainty did not exist. While this discussion only scratches the surface of the 
rules versus standards debate, it should be clear that a rule is theoretically 
preferable to a standard in the context of patent litigation. 
While a rule may be theoretically preferable to a standard in patent 
litigation, an important consideration is whether lawmakers can, practically 
speaking, draft a workable rule. In general, where a test covers myriad actions 
and scenarios that do not share common facts or elements, it will be difficult to 
draft a workable, simple rule.121 For instance, negligence applies to numerous 
acts, but those acts vary widely in terms of their particular key facts,122 thus 
making a simple rule difficult to draft. On the other hand, basic income tax 
covers numerous acts, most of which share factually similar elements,123 thus 
making a rule much more efficient and easy to draft. 
2. Lawmakers Will Have Trouble Drafting a Simple, Clear Rule 
Because offers and advertisements come in all shapes and sizes, lawmakers 
will have difficulty drafting a simple rule. Currently the definition of an offer 
includes contract-law offers but excludes most advertisements and other 
promotions. As discussed, the primary policy behind making an offer to sell an 
act of infringement is to prevent competitors from generating commercial 
interest in infringing technology to the detriment of the patentee.124 Since 
advertisements and other promotions exist primarily to generate commercial 
interest,125 they should be included within the definition of an offer. 
Yet including “advertisements and other promotions” within the “offer” 
definition will create uncertainty unless lawmakers can define with some rule-
like precision what constitutes “advertisements” and “promotions.” On the 
other hand, creating clear, rule-like definitions of “advertisements” and 
“promotions” will be a difficult task. The terms are not defined in the patent 
statutes. Law dictionaries define “advertising” broadly to include any “action of 
 
discretion to increase the damages up to treble damages. Id. (“[T]he court may increase the 
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”). Further, courts can issue 
injunctions. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012). 
 121.  Kaplow, supra note 113, at 563-64, 573; Sunstein, supra note 113, at 1003. 
Theoretically, one could draft a complex rule to cover all anticipated fact patterns. Kaplow, 
supra note 113, at 590-96 (noting the difference between simple and complex rules and 
standards). Practically speaking, complex rules are rarely adopted by courts. 
 122.  For example, driving, food handling, floor maintenance, surgery, etc. 
 123.  For example, though peoples’ earning amounts and sources may vary widely, they 
can be grouped together as “income.” 
 124.  Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 173.  
 125.  See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 25 
(4th ed. 2000) (defining “advertisement” as “[a] notice, such as a poster or a paid 
announcement in the print, broadcast, or electronic media, designed to attract public 
attention or patronage”). 
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drawing the public’s attention to something to promote its sale.”126 
Other areas of the law may assist in crafting a definition. The terms appear 
in another intellectual property statute—the Lanham Act127—but it does not 
define them.128 Case law interpreting the Lanham Act indicates that widely-
distributed commercial promotion constitutes “advertising,” but courts have 
struggled with how widely-distributed the promotional activities must be to 
constitute “advertising.”129 Furthermore, the Lanham Act distinguishes 
between “advertising” and “promotion” by listing them separately.130 Courts 
note that a distinction exists between “advertising” and “promotion,” but they 
seldom pinpoint it other than to note that “promotion” is more inclusive than 
traditional advertising, which must be disseminated widely.131 The Second 
Circuit provided some assistance when it observed: 
[T]he distinction between advertising and promotion lies in the form of the 
representation. Although advertising is generally understood to consist of 
widespread communication through print or broadcast media, “promotion” 
may take other forms of publicity used in the relevant industry, such as 
displays at trade shows and sales presentations to buyers.132 
Courts continue to vary widely regarding what communications constitute 
“advertising” or “promotion.” Some courts define advertising and promotions 
as activities that reach more than a few individuals of the relevant purchasing 
public, while others allow even a single letter to suffice.133 
 
 126.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (9th ed. 2009). 
 127.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (2012). 
 128.  See Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 129.  See 1 JAMES B. ASTRACHAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ADVERTISING § 11.02 n.356 
(Matthew Bender 2013) (collecting cases). 
 130.  Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (“Any person who, on or in 
connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any 
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of 
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, 
which . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, 
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or 
commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or 
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”) (emphasis added). 
 131.  See, e.g., Gmurzynska v. Hutton, 355 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A]lthough 
representations less formal than those made as part of a classic advertising campaign may 
suffice, they must be disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public.”) (quoting 
Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 314 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 2002)); 
Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1384 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The courts are also in 
agreement, however, that ‘the Act’s reach is broader than merely the “classic advertising 
campaign.”’”) (quoting Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F. 
Supp. 1521, 1534 (S.D.N.Y.1994)). 
 132.  Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, 314 F.3d at 57.  
 133.  See ASTRACHAN ET AL., supra note 129, at § 11.02 n.356 (collecting cases). 
Compare First Health Grp. Corp. v. BCE Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 803-04 (7th Cir. 
2001) (“Advertising is a form of promotion to anonymous recipients, as distinguished from 
face-to-face communication. In normal usage, an advertisement read by millions (or even 
thousands in a trade magazine) is advertising, while a person-to-person pitch by an account 
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If many decades of interpretation of the Lanham Act have failed to reveal 
clear definitions of advertising and promotions, the task is likely not feasible. 
Yet lawmakers should not simply give up and fail to provide any guidance. Nor 
should lawmakers exclude “advertisements” and “promotions” from patent 
law’s definition of an offer simply because clear rules are difficult to draft. 
Indeed, while defining “advertisements” with precision is difficult, the same is 
true with the definition of a contract-law offer. Contract law requires no 
particular words or actions to make an offer, and the same words can amount to 
an offer in one circumstance but not in another.134 If decades of Lanham Act 
interpretation demonstrate the difficulty of defining an “advertisement,” 
centuries of contract law demonstrate the difficulty of drafting a simple rule to 
cover the myriad acts that might constitute a formal offer to sell. 
In many cases, actions that fall just short of constituting a contract-law 
offer will fall clearly within a definition of promotional activity.135 To some 
extent then, if lawmakers broaden patent law’s definition of an offer from the 
contract-law definition to one that includes advertisements and promotions, 
they will simply be trading one uncertain question for another. The net 
uncertainty may not increase much, if at all. 
Hence, lawmakers should appreciate that a simple, clear rule may be 
difficult to create, but should strive to give as much guidance as possible. The 
next Subpart provides specific recommendations for a test that will provide 
clarity to the definition of “advertising and other promotions.” 
B. Patent Law’s Definition of an “Offer” Should Include an Objective 
“Commercialization” Test 
The Federal Circuit has established that the primary policy behind making 
an “offer to sell” an act of infringement is to prevent competitors from 
generating commercial interest in infringing technology to the detriment of the 
patentee.136 To give competitors clarity, lawmakers should tie the definition of 
an offer to the concept of commercialization. Thus, lawmakers should be less 
 
executive is not.”), with Seven-Up Co., 86 F.3d at 1386 (presentation made to eleven bottlers 
is advertising or promotion), and Mobius Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Fourth Dimension Software, 
Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1005, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding single letter actionable). 
 134.  See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 15, at 108 (“[T]here is no magic formula to 
determine whether a particular communication is an offer . . . . [T]he ordinary meaning of 
language is influential, but never determinative. For example, the word ‘quote’ may be 
understood as making a commitment, while the word ‘offer’ may, in context be deemed a 
mere price quotation.”) (footnote omitted). 
 135.  A number of cases find language to fall just short of an offer, and instead to be 
merely quotations, proposals, invitations to treat, etc. See, e.g., Cox v. Denton, 180 P. 261, 
261 (Kan. 1919) (holding that a letter asking, “Do you want to buy 240 good 100 lb. (1,000 
lb.) cattle at 8.25 must be sold by Friday” was a mere inquiry). While not an offer, the 
quoted language was clearly a commercial proposal. 
 136.  Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 173.  
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concerned with the raw number of recipients of a competitor’s communication 
and more about whether the communication generates commercial interest in 
an infringing product. 
Advertisements and promotions should be defined as infringing offers 
when they objectively appear likely to generate commercial interest in an 
infringing product. As explained below, such a definition protects the patentee 
from price erosion and lost sales and provides clarity to competitors. 
1. An Objective “Commercialization” Test Protects Patentees From 
Price Erosion and Provides Clarity to Competitors 
When a business indicates to the relevant market an intent to compete 
against a patent holder, the competing business potentially causes downward 
price pressure on the patented goods, since the market expects the patentee to 
lower its price to compete with the infringer.137 This downward price pressure, 
often termed price erosion, harms the patentee by causing it to lose profits.138 
The mechanism of price erosion demonstrates that the law should not be 
greatly concerned simply with the number of recipients of a competitor’s 
advertisement or promotion. A single communication evidencing an intent to 
compete may result in significant price erosion if it is directed to an entity with 
the ability to affect the market price of a patented good. For example, if an 
entity represents the primary (or only) end-buyer of a patented good, then a 
single solicitation to one of its high-level officers may result in price erosion. 
This suggests that, at least in some contexts, a single letter or phone call might 
constitute an advertisement or promotion. 
On the other hand, if a competitor directs a single solicitation solely to an 
entity representing only a small portion of the end-buyers of a patented good, 
this is unlikely to cause much (if any) price erosion. The same could be true if a 
competitor sends multiple promotions but the total audience nonetheless 
represents only a small portion of the market. Should patent law exclude these 
actions from the definition of an offer? 
One option is for patent law to define an offer (including advertisements 
and promotions) in terms of whether the communication causes harm. While 
the definition makes sense in terms of the theory behind price erosion, it carries 
with it significant uncertainty because calculating price erosion can be 
 
 137. See, e.g., Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1886); Transocean 
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1308 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 4, at 791-92); Osborn, Offer 
as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 174-75.  
 138.  Several articles explore the concept of price erosion in more depth. See, e.g., 
David Bohrer et al., The Shifting Sands of Price Erosion: Price Erosion Damages Shift by 
Tens of Millions of Dollars Depending Upon the Admissibility of Pre-Notice Eroded Prices, 
25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 723 (2009).  
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complicated.139 Furthermore, patent law currently does not define an offer in 
terms of harm, but rather in terms of whether it meets the requirements of a 
contract-law offer.140 Not all contract-law offers will harm the patentee, such as 
where the offer is to a small portion of the relevant market and the offer is not 
accepted. 
Instead of defining an offer in terms of whether it causes harm, a better 
option is to define it objectively in terms of whether the offer amounts to an 
apparent attempt to commercialize, regardless of the scale of the 
commercialization. By “apparent attempt” I mean an objective, not subjective, 
standard of whether the steps taken would appear to a reasonable person to be 
an attempt to commercialize the technology. Under this definition, a single 
promotion could constitute infringement, even if it did not cause provable price 
erosion, as long as it appears from the circumstances to have generated 
commercial interest in infringing technology. This test puts the initial onus on 
the competitor to avoid commercializing infringing technology. 
One may object to a commercialization test because it is over-inclusive 
from the standpoint of harm to the patentee: first, as mentioned, the 
communication may not have been widely distributed enough to cause price 
erosion, and second, even if it had been more widely distributed, the market 
may be structured such that price erosion would not have resulted.141 While 
this is true, there is reason to believe that in many instances patentees will not 
pursue infringement claims when they cannot prove harm because the 
tremendous cost of litigation142 would deter them from bringing suit.143 At the 
same time, the commercialization test respects the patent holder’s right to 
exclude competitors. 
Hence, an objective commercialization test gives a clearer rule than asking 
 
 139.  See Christopher S. Marchese, Patent Infringement and Future Lost Profits 
Damages, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 747, 759-60 (1994) (describing price erosion calculations and 
stating that “[t]he interaction of elasticity of demand and claims for price erosion may be 
confusing in some instances”); Gregory J. Werden et al., Economic Analysis of Lost Profits 
from Patent Infringement With and Without Noninfringing Substitutes, 27 AIPLA Q.J. 305 
passim (1999) (describing price erosion calculations in detail). 
 140.  Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 141.  For example, the patentee may not have had market power, perhaps because there 
were acceptable non-infringing alternatives. In such a market, a widely distributed infringing 
offer to sell will not cause price erosion. See Werden et al., supra note 139, at 315 (“The less 
close a substitute the infringer’s product is for the patentee’s product, the less is the effect of 
the infringement on the patentee’s price.”). 
 142.  The average litigation cost to take a small patent infringement suit (less than 
$1,000,000 at stake) through trial was almost $1,000,000. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW 
ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-153 (2011). 
 143.  Patent law provides for recovery of damages to “compensate for the infringement, 
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). A reasonable royalty 
is calculated based on a hypothetical contractual negotiation that might have taken place 
between the patentee and the infringer at a time just before infringement occurred. See Rite-
Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Where there is no provable 
harm to the patentee, the reasonable royalty should be very small.  
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whether price erosion is likely to occur. This is not to say that the rule is crystal 
clear; only that it is clearer than determining price erosion. While the test is 
broad, and sometimes over-inclusive, it provides more clarity, which efficient 
markets desire, and will force competitors to focus their efforts in areas other 
than drafting clever promotions that avoid causing significant price erosion. 
2. An Objective “Commercialization” Test Protects Patentees From 
Lost Sales 
In addition to harm from price erosion, a patentee who practices the 
invention might be able to show harm from lost sales. Obviously, if the 
infringing offer to sell culminated in an infringing sale, the patentee would 
generally be able to show a lost sale. But circumstances may exist where the 
competitor’s eventual sale does not infringe and yet the patentee may be able to 
show a lost sale. The primary scenario for this kind of harm to the patentee is 
when a competitor engages in a bait-and-switch tactic.144 
In a patent infringement context, the “bait” occurs when a competitor 
generates interest in an infringing technology without crossing the “offer” 
threshold, whatever that threshold happens to be. Under current patent law, 
since a general advertisement will not constitute infringement, a competitor can 
advertise infringing technology. Once the competitor generates market interest 
in the infringing technology, the competitor flips the “switch” by substituting 
alternate non-infringing technology. If the purchaser decides to purchase from 
the competitor despite the switch, it is likely that the patentee has lost a sale. 
Some have questioned whether bait-and-switches would occur: since a 
successful switch implies a non-infringing substitute, the competitor would 
simply have offered the non-infringing substitute to begin with.145 But a bait-
and-switch scenario could occur in a market where the non-infringing substitute 
is imperfect, i.e., it is good but not as good as the patented technology. In this 
situation, the patented technology may be the attention-grabbing, state-of-the-
art product that generates interest from purchasers. 
Still, one might ask how a bait-and-switch could occur with an imperfect 
substitute—wouldn’t the buyer simply leave and seek out the patentee’s 
superior product? Not necessarily. Several factors relating to information and 
transaction costs may contribute to the customer staying with the competitor, 
such as where relationships between the buyer and seller are important, where 
 
 144.  See Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., Inc., 514 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(upholding a jury verdict that characterized defendant’s offering to sell an infringing device 
but subsequently completing the sale with a non-infringing device as a bait-and-switch); 
Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Corp., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1792, 1795 (W.D. Wis. 1997) 
(“[B]efore offers to sell were included in Section 271(a), a third party could employ ‘bait and 
switch’ tactics by offering for sale a patented invention and then switching the offered design 
to a non-infringing one before the sale was complete.”).  
 145.  See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 4, at 795 n.273. 
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the buyer has already expended considerable transaction costs with the 
competitor and is unwilling to start over, and where information costs are high 
such that the competitor is unaware of the patentee. 
Where information and transaction costs will cause some buyers to stay 
with a competitor even after it pulls the switch, competitors will sometimes 
divert a percentage of sales from the patentee. Such diverted sales contravene 
the policy of preventing a competitor from generating commercial interest in 
infringing technology to the detriment of the patentee. Hence, patent law 
should protect patentees against this type of activity. 
A commercialization test would deter bait-and-switch scenarios by 
subjecting the competitor to an infringement suit based on the advertisement or 
promotions that generates the commercial interest. Obviously, if the “bait” (i.e., 
the advertisement or promotion) itself is actionable as infringement, the 
competitor will be unlikely to engage in the behavior. Further, under the 
objective test, the competitor cannot defend on the grounds that it subjectively 
never intended to infringe because its subjective intent is not determinative. 
It might be argued, however, that patentees may be protected against 
intentional146 bait-and-switch tactics through laws prohibiting false advertising. 
For example, the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) prohibits any 
“false advertisement,” which it defines as “an advertisement . . . which is 
misleading in a material respect.”147 Although apparently never litigated in the 
context of patent infringement, engaging in bait-and-switch advertising fits 
squarely within the FTC Act’s prohibition against false advertising.148 
In addition, any advertisement to sell a product that the advertiser knows 
may infringe a patent may constitute false advertising if the advertiser does not 
disclose the risk of infringement. In determining whether an advertisement is 
misleading under the FTC Act, courts shall consider “the extent to which the 
advertisement fails to reveal facts . . . [that are] material with respect to 
consequences which may result from the use of the [advertised product].”149 
Since a buyer who uses an infringing product in the United States commits 
patent infringement,150 the buyer would be subject to patent infringement 
damages. Such damages would appear to fall under the natural meaning of the 
 
 146.  A competitor may engage in an intentional bait-and-switch (as where the 
competitor never intended to sell the first-offered technology) or an unintentional bait-and-
switch (as where the competitor modifies the offered technology after discovering, or in 
good faith more closely analyzing, a problematic patent). 
 147.  15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (2012). 
 148.  16 C.F.R. § 238.1 (2006) (“No advertisement containing an offer to sell a product 
should be published when the offer is not a bona fide effort to sell the advertised product.”). 
 149.  15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1). 
 150.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (making the use of an infringing product within the 
United States an act of infringement). If the eventual contemplated sale were to occur 
outside the United States or for use outside the United States, materiality under the FTC Act 
would likely depend in part on whether the use would infringe in the country where the sale 
or use would occur. 
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phrase “material” consequences. 
The FTC Act, however, may not provide adequate protection to patentees, 
because it does not create a private cause of action, but instead only empowers 
the FTC to bring actions.151 The FTC may decide not to bring a suit for a 
variety of reasons, including limitations on resources and broader public 
interest concerns.152 Further, since the focus of the FTC Act is on the consumer 
and not the patentee, even if a suit is brought, patentees will not receive a 
remedy. 
Besides the federal FTC Act, various state laws may provide patentees 
some protection against bait-and-switch tactics. Each state has adopted similar 
statutes called “little FTC acts” and has adopted other consumer protection 
measures to prohibit other unfair or deceptive practices.153 Unlike the federal 
FTC Act, many state acts give injured consumers the power to sue merchants 
who violate the statute and some provide for treble damages, punitive damages, 
minimum damages, and/or the award of attorney’s fees to successful consumer 
plaintiffs.154 While the state acts may disincentivize parties from engaging in 
bait-and-switch tactics, many allow only consumers to sue, as opposed to 
competitors (i.e., patentees) and thus do not adequately protect the patentee’s 
interests.155 Other state statutes, however, have been construed to allow 
competitors to sue.156 In such states, a patentee may have some protection 
against intentional bait-and-switch tactics but would be required to prove: (1) 
that the competitor’s communication constituted an “advertisement” under the 
state statute and (2) that the competitor had deceptive intent. Both of these 
proofs may be difficult. 
In addition to the federal FTC Act and the various state actions, section 43 
 
 151.  See Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: 
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 441 n.21 (1991) (citing 
cases for this proposition). 
 152.  Id. at 441-43. 
 153.  Id. at 446-52; see also Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer 
Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163 (2011); Stewart Macaulay, 
Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts Scholarship and Teaching vs. State Unfair 
and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 575, 
582-89 (1989). 
 154.  Sovern, supra note 151, at 448. 
 155.  See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.025.1 (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1345.02(a) (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-1(5)(M) (2006); see also David L. Belt, 
The Standard for Determining “Unfair Acts or Practices” Under State Unfair Trade 
Practices Acts, 80 CONN. B.J. 247, 310-311 (2006) (discussing who has standing to sue 
under various state deceptive practices acts). 
 156.  See, e.g., Harrington Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 248 S.E.2d 739, 742 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1978) (holding that North Carolina’s deceptive trade practices act, N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 75-1.1(a), allows suits by competitors as well as consumers); see also Matthew W. 
Sawchak & Kip D. Nelson, Defining Unfairness In “Unfair Trade Practices”, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 2033, 2078 n.242 (2012) (noting competitor-based suits under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-
1.1(a)). 
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of the Lanham Act may provide patentees additional protection against bait-
and-switch tactics. The Lanham Act prohibits a “false or misleading 
representation of fact, which . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, 
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his 
or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.”157 
Competitors can bring actions under the Lanham Act.158 Though it has 
apparently never been litigated, it would appear that if a patentee could prove 
the competitor intentionally used bait-and-switch tactic and never intended to 
sell the infringing article, the patentee could bring a false advertising claim. 
Even if a patentee could convince a court to apply the Lanham Act in this novel 
manner, the patentee would still be put to the difficult process of proving a 
competitor’s deceptive intent. In addition, the competitor’s activity would have 
to fit into the Lanham Act’s somewhat amorphous definition of “advertising or 
promotion.”159 
In sum, federal and state false advertising laws may not adequately protect 
patentees against intentional bait-and-switch tactics that use advertisements or 
promotions of infringing technology as the bait. Further, they would not appear 
to protect the patentee against unintentional bait-and-switch activities, even 
though such activities could divert sales from the patentee. Therefore, patent 
law could better protect patent holders by adopting an objective 
commercialization test. 
This Subpart has discussed protecting patentees from the harms associated 
with price erosion and lost sales. The next Subpart shifts the focus to tailoring 
the definition of an offer so as to protect competitors that engage in beneficial 
competitive activity. 
C. Patent Law’s Definition of an “Offer” Should Allow Good-Faith 
Market Inquiry by Competitors 
While the test for an offer in patent infringement law should encompass 
advertisements and promotions broadly defined, the law should leave room for 
competitors to explore whether it would be profitable either to obtain a license 
from the patent holder or to develop competing, but non-infringing technology. 
Purposefully configuring technology that avoids patent infringement is known 
as “designing around” a patent. The Federal Circuit160 and writers161 endorse 
 
 157.  Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 158.  See, e.g., Am. Ass’n of Orthodontists v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 434 F.3d 1100, 
1103-04 (8th Cir. 2006); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
 159.  See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text. 
 160.  See, e.g., Cross Med. Prods. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 480 F.3d 1335, 
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that designing around patented technology is something “that 
patent law encourages”); State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (“One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called ‘negative incentive’ to 
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the practice of designing around patents in part because it disseminates 
technology and encourages further innovation—by studying a patent or 
patented technology, a competitor can devise improvements, simplifications, or 
other modifications more cheaply than without the knowledge acquired from 
the patented item. 
Since the design-around process can benefit society, the law should be 
careful not to define an infringing “offer” so broadly as to unnecessarily chill 
commercial activity that would legitimately compete with the patented 
technology.162 The law should not permit a competitor to commercialize 
infringing technology, but it should permit the competitor to gauge the market 
demand for technology similar to the infringing technology, as long as the 
competitor makes clear that it will not purposefully commercialize infringing 
technology. Competitors will generally need knowledge of market demand 
before deciding whether to invest resources in developing design-around 
technology. If competitors cannot gauge market demand, they will forego 
investing in design-around technology and society will be worse off.163 
To break this impasse, the law should be clear that a competitor cannot 
promote infringing technology, but should allow a competitor to tell the 
market, in effect, “we hope to create technology that does not infringe but that 
accomplishes the same result as the patented technology.” As long as the 
competitor is clear that it has no intent to offer infringing technology, the law 
should permit it to gauge marketability without having to spell out the details of 
its (yet-to-be-developed) design-around technology. 
It is true that even where a competitor is clear that it intends to develop 
non-infringing (design-around) technology, such market testing may sometimes 
cause price erosion. Suppose for example that the competitor is a company 
known for its ingenuity and ability to design around patented technology. Such 
a company’s mere announcement that it intends to design-around a patent may 
lead the market to believe the item is forthcoming and thus lower the price the 
patentee can charge. Even so, such price erosion should not be actionable 
 
‘design around’ a competitor’s [patented] products, . . . thus bringing a steady flow of 
innovations to the marketplace.”).  
 161.  See, e.g., Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1045, 1050 (2001) (“[T]hose who invent new devices by intentionally designing 
around a patent nonetheless advance the public welfare and fulfill the purpose of the Patent 
Clause.”); Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. 
REV. 1421, 1434 (2009); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 S.M.U. L. 
REV. 123 (2006); Paul N. Katz & Robert R. Riddle, Designing Around A United States 
Patent, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 647 (2004). 
 162.  See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 4, at 779 (“An overly broad definition 
of offer to sell infringement could have a chilling effect on competitors, particularly attempts 
to design around the patent. If something short of a commercial offer could constitute 
infringement, a competitor’s ability to assess the marketability of a device would be limited 
and would risk earlier exposure to an infringement suit.”). 
 163.  Note that defining “offer” so broadly as to preclude market assessment might 
impermissibly restrict free speech. See infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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because the harm to the patentee is not from an expected infringement, but 
rather from an expected non-infringing activity. 
All of this may seem overly complex to those unfamiliar with patent law. 
One might wonder: if the competitor’s technology is going to be non-
infringing, then it should not matter whether the competitor “offers” it for 
sale—exposure to liability will depend on whether the device infringes or not. 
In essence, this discussion might appear to conflate the issue of offer with the 
issue of infringement. The conflation of offer and infringement is justifiable, 
however, because despite competitors’ desire to predict accurately whether 
their technology will infringe, they find predicting infringement difficult.164 
To develop non-infringing technology, the competitor must guess how a 
court will construe a patent’s claims and then determine a technological 
solution that avoids the claims while delivering the same or a similar result.165 
But construing patent claims is famously difficult.166 The ex ante uncertainty 
regarding whether a given technology infringes a patent’s claims can be 
heightened by the unpredictable application of the doctrine of equivalents, 
which states that even if the accused technology does not literally meet the 
requirements of the patent claims, it may be “equivalent.”167 To make matters 
worse, the law regarding the doctrine of equivalents is in a state of flux.168 
 
 164.  See, e.g., Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 
F.3d 1337, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating 
that patent law is an area “where ultimate outcomes are difficult to predict”); Colleen V. 
Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 285 (2011) (“It is popular to 
characterize patent litigation as uncertain and unpredictable.”). 
 165.  Literal infringement of a patent claim requires that the accused technology contain 
each and every limitation of the patent claim. E.g., Enercon GmbH v. ITC, 151 F.3d 1376, 
1384 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 166.  The test for infringement, while easily stated, masks great uncertainty in part 
because the metes and bounds of each patent claim are not known until a court construes 
them, a process that is notoriously unpredictable. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Markman 
Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 
233 (2005) (reporting the reversal rate for appealed claim terms from 1996 to 2003 was 
34.5%); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped To Resolve Patent Cases?, 
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2001) (“[D]istrict court judges improperly construe patent claim 
terms in 33% of the cases appealed to the Federal Circuit.”); David L. Schwartz, Practice 
Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008). 
 167.  Under the doctrine of equivalents, the “scope of a patent is not limited to its literal 
terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims described” to prevent competitors 
from avoiding infringement by making unimportant and insubstantial differences to their 
technology. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 
(2002). The doctrine of equivalents “renders the scope of patents less certain.” Id.  
 168.  Commentators have explored the doctrine of equivalents at length. See, e.g., John 
R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 955, 962-63 (2007); Paul R. Michel, The Role and Responsibility of Patent 
Attorneys in Improving the Doctrine of Equivalents, 40 IDEA 123, 123 (2000); Lee 
Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371 
(2010); R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of 
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Because the issue of infringement is unpredictable, competitors should be 
free to explore the marketability of competing technology without exposure to 
patent infringement lawsuits. The law can give this freedom by defining an 
offer so as to exclude market-testing activity by competitors as long as it makes 
clear it intends to develop a non-infringing design-around. This will give 
competitors some breathing room to explore the market without generating 
expensive litigation. Only if the market indicates a receptiveness to design-
around technology will the competitor need to decide whether to invest in 
trying to develop specific designs. By permitting relatively inexpensive market 
testing, the law allows competitors to devote more resources to developing the 
actual design-around technology. 
The protection of early-stage market testing should cease, however, when 
the competitor indicates a present intent to commercialize a specific design. 
Once the competitor attempts to commercialize a specific design (as opposed to 
a generic and yet-to-be-developed design-around design), it should be open to 
an infringement suit that considers the specific design being commercialized. 
By exposing the competitor to patent infringement liability, the law will 
protect the patentee from price erosion and will force the competitor to think 
hard before commercializing a specific design. Before the competitor 
commercializes the specific design-around technology, it should wisely expend 
resources analyzing the patent to determine (as best it can) whether its design 
will infringe or not. Depending on its infringement analysis, the competitor 
may decide to further tweak its design to avoid infringement or to give up on 
the design-around and approach the patentee for a license. But all this will be 
done before advertisement-based price erosion harms the patentee. 
In summary, to encourage beneficial design-around technology, the law 
should define an offer to permit free but careful assessment of the market for 
design-around technology without fear of litigation. This will allow more 
resources first to assess the market and later to attempt to develop the specific 
design-around. Only if and after the competitor develops specific designs 
should it incur the costs of ascertaining the threat of patent infringement 
liability. But to be fair to the patentee, the competitor should be exposed to 
patent infringement liability once it commercializes one or more specific 
designs. The law can accomplish all these objectives while including 
“advertisements” and other “promotions” within the definition of an infringing 
offer. 
V. EFFECTS FARTHER AFIELD 
This Section briefly highlights a few more impacts of including 
advertisement and promotions in § 271(a)’s definition of an offer to emphasize 
 
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 234-37 (2002).  
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the numerous downstream consequences of the law change.169 
A. Possible Liability for Third Party Intermediaries Such As Advertising 
Agencies 
Making the action of running an advertisement an act of infringement 
raises a question of who is liable for the advertisement (assuming it infringes). 
For simplicity, I identify two potential actors: the technology company that will 
eventually sell the technology and the advertising agency that helps design and 
distribute the advertisement.170 In a basic scenario, the technology company 
will hire the advertising agency, but the technology company will supply the 
technical information included in the advertisement. Should only the 
technology be liable for patent infringement? Only the advertising agency? Or 
both? 
If one defines the act of advertising to constitute infringement, an 
advertising agency would literally be liable as an infringer, just as a third party 
distributor is liable for “selling” items on behalf of a wholesaler. This would 
obviously be an unfortunate situation for advertisers, because direct 
infringement does not require intent or knowledge.171 While advertising 
intermediaries could contract for indemnification against infringement, I think 
the better solution is to define the infringing “advertiser” exclusively as the 
underlying technology company that requests the advertisement. Holding 
advertising agencies and other intermediaries liable would either dramatically 
chill or significantly increase the costs of advertising for all technology, since 
the intermediary cannot be sure in advance what might infringe. To avoid these 
costs, advertising intermediaries should be exempt from direct infringement for 
advertisements created for or designed on behalf of third parties. 
In addition to direct infringement, patent law imposes liability for inducing 
infringement and contributory infringement.172 Outside the patent law context, 
contributory infringement has a broader definition,173 but Congress defined 
contributory infringement in patent law narrowly to involve the supply of a 
 
 169.  The potential effects are legion. Broadening the definition of an “offer” under 
§ 271(a) to include advertisements might cause a similar broadening of the definition of “on 
sale” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (superseded by 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (effective Mar. 
16, 2013)), setting off a whole new set of ripple effects.  
 170.  Of course, a company may design and distribute its own advertisement without 
using an agency. In addition, more than one intermediary may be involved, for example a 
magazine publisher or an Internet service provider. My conclusions regarding the advertising 
agency would apply generally to other intermediaries. 
 171.  Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011). 
 172.  35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b)-(c) (2012).  
 173.  See Alfred C. Yen, Torts and the Construction of Inducement and Contributory 
Liability in Amazon and Visa, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 513, 513 (2009) (“Contributory 
liability [traditionally] applied if a defendant had knowledge of infringement by another and 
materially contributed to the infringement.”). 
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component or other product that can be used to infringe a patent.174 Advertising 
agencies do not supply components so they will not be liable as contributory 
infringers. This may be a good thing for advertisers and other intermediaries 
who are often accused of contributory infringement under trademark and 
copyright law.175 
Induced infringement, unlike direct infringement, requires the accused 
inducer to have knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent 
infringement.176 Knowledge can include direct knowledge of infringement or 
“willful blindness,” which the Supreme Court defines as having two 
requirements: “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high 
probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions 
to avoid learning of that fact.”177 Hence, under an inducement theory, an 
advertising agency might be liable if it knew or was willfully blind to the fact 
that the advertisement it ran constituted infringement. 
In addition to the knowledge requirement, induced infringement requires 
“inducement.” Although in common terminology inducement means to cause a 
person to do something he otherwise would not have done, it is not clear that 
patent law’s definition is so narrow.178 It is possible, though not clear, that 
“inducing” might include anything a defendant does to help a third party 
infringe.179 If courts understand “inducement” under the broadest definition, 
advertising agencies could be liable because they literally help the 
infringement. But under any narrower definition, an advertising agency is 
unlikely to be liable even if it knew of the infringement, because advertising 
agencies are unlikely to attempt to get others to infringe. Though neither the 
Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit has settled this issue, the most recent en 
banc Federal Circuit opinion on the issue indicates that “inducement” connotes 
a situation where a third party advises or encourages others to engage in 
infringing conduct.180 If this is true, advertising agencies and other third party 
 
 174.  35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or 
imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented 
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially 
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article 
or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a 
contributory infringer.”). 
 175.  See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077-1079 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(copyright case involving an Internet service provider); Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. 
Supp. 2d 463, 501-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (trademark case involving an online retailer); Gillette 
Co. v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 662, 663-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Lanham Act false 
advertising case involving an advertising agency). 
 176.  Global-Tech Appliances, 131 S. Ct. at 2068. 
 177.  Id. at 2068-71. 
 178.  Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 228-
29 (2005). 
 179.  Id. at 229. 
 180.  See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. 
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intermediaries can breathe easier. 
B. Increased Incentives to Innovate 
Including advertisements within the definition of an offer may increase net 
incentives to innovate. As we have seen, advertisements of infringing 
technology can lead to price erosion, thus harming patentees.181 Under the 
current standard of an offer under § 271(a), patentees have no remedy against 
advertisement-induced price erosion.182 Patent theory suggests that the more 
patent holders can profit from their patents (including by suing infringers), the 
more incentive and ability they have to innovate and commercialize their 
technology.183 
Because patentees currently have no remedy for the harm of advertisement-
induced price erosion, they profit less than they would under a broader 
definition of an offer. Accordingly, people and businesses will innovate and 
commercialize less than if they could seek a remedy for advertisement-induced 
price erosion. I do not mean to suggest that broadening the definition of an 
offer to include advertisements will result in a dramatic increase in incentives 
to innovate or commercialize technology. Rather, the effect is at the margins. 
C. First Amendment Concerns from Regulating Commercial Speech 
The First Amendment protects commercial speech that “does no more than 
propose a commercial transaction.”184 Contract-law offers and advertisements 
are forms of commercial speech, and thus this Subpart analyzes how the First 
Amendment impacts the definition of an offer under § 271(a). 
Traditionally, the First Amendment did not protect commercial speech but 
rather focused on other forms of speech such as political speech.185 Beginning 
in the mid-1970s, however, the Supreme Court began to protect commercial 
speech, noting that the free flow of commercial information is “indispensable” 
to the public so that its private economic decisions in a free enterprise economy 
 
Cir. 2012) (“[S]ection 271(b) extends liability to a party who advises, encourages, or 
otherwise induces others to engage in infringing conduct . . . .”). Of course, the phrase 
“otherwise induces” renders the meaning uncertain, but the doctrine of noscitur a sociis (“it 
is known by its associates”) suggests that “induces” connotes advisement and 
encouragement. 
 181.  Supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text. 
 182.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 183.  E.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707-12 (2001). 
 184.  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
776 (1976). 
 185.  See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“We are equally clear 
that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial 
advertising.”). 
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will be “intelligent and well informed.”186 
1. Restricting the Definition of an Offer 
While the First Amendment may generally protect commercial speech, it 
does not prevent Congress from outlawing advertisements of infringing 
technology. The First Amendment does not protect commercial speech that 
advertises illegal activities.187 Because patent law makes “selling” a device that 
infringes a patent an unlawful act,188 an advertisement or other offer to sell an 
infringing device is an advertisement/offer for an illegal activity;189 thus, the 
advertisement/offer is not protected by the First Amendment.190 This is true 
whether one defines an offer as a formal, contract-law offer or as an 
advertisement/promotion, because both generally constitute commercial speech 
that does no more than propose a commercial transaction.191 Broadening the 
definition of an offer to include advertisements and promotions would 
obviously increase the amount of protected speech, but it would not run afoul 
of the First Amendment. 
Importantly, however, the First Amendment might limit how broadly 
courts can interpret the term “offer.” Courts could not define an offer to sell so 
 
 186.  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. 
 187.  Id. at 770-72 (listing categories of commercial speech regulation that “are surely 
permissible,” including regulating “advertisements [that] are themselves illegal in any 
way.”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563-
64 (1980) (“The government may ban . . . commercial speech related to illegal 
activity . . . .”) (citations omitted); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (“For commercial speech 
to [be protected by the First Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity . . . .”). 
 188.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without authority . . . sells any patented 
invention, within the United States, . . . during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the 
patent.”). 
 189.  There is one scenario where a court might have the power to restrain the “offer” 
but not the “sale,” and that is when an “offer” is made in the United States, but the eventual 
sale would be consummated outside of the United States. If such an offer were held to 
infringe, it would not be an offer for illegal activity, and the restriction would need to be 
analyzed under the Supreme Court’s commercial speech test set forth in Central Hudson. 
The most recent Federal Circuit interpretation of infringement for an “offer to sell,” 
however, found that offers in the United States for sales abroad would not infringe; rather, 
offers made abroad for sales that would be in the United States do infringe. See Transocean 
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1309 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The focus should not be on the location of the offer, but rather the location 
of the future sale that would occur pursuant to the offer.”).  
 190.  See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The 
Clash Between Intellectual Property and the First Amendment from an Economic 
Perspective, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 36 (2001); Mark A. Lemley & 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE 
L.J. 147, 234 (1998). 
 191.  See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (noting that 
the “core notion of commercial speech” is “speech which does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction”) (quotations and citations omitted).  
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broadly as to include mere market investigation (e.g., to discern whether to take 
a license from the patentee or to try to design around the patent), because such 
speech is far removed from selling an infringing device.192 
2. Restricting Preliminary Restraints 
In addition to restrictions on the definition of an offer, the First 
Amendment may also restrict whether and to what extent courts can 
preliminarily enjoin offers to sell allegedly infringing devices. Preliminary 
injunctions193 against offers and advertisements constitute a “prior restraint” on 
speech, which is defined as a “governmental restriction on speech or 
publication before its actual expression.”194 The First Amendment strongly 
disfavors prior restraints.195 It is not that speech can never be restrained before 
its utterance, but the presumption against prior restraint is most forceful when, 
as in the case of preliminary relief, the law abridges “expression prior to a full 
and fair determination of the constitutionally protected nature of the expression 
by an independent judicial forum.”196 As Professor Redish argues, a full and 
fair judicial assessment of the accused speech is the touchstone for whether 
restraint is permissible.197 
In patent law, preliminary restraints against offers to sell allegedly 
infringing devices implicate prior restraint concerns: not only must a court 
make a determination that the speech is commercial (likely an easy 
determination), but also it must determine that the offer is to sell a device that is 
actually infringing. As discussed above, determining infringement is extremely 
difficult; it often involves ambitious study of the technology involved, the 
patent’s claims, the patent’s validity, and an analysis of whether the accused 
device infringes under the doctrine of equivalents.198 If the device offered for 
sale does not infringe the patent, then no justification for restraining the speech 
exists. Yet in many cases a court is not likely to know whether the device 
 
 192.  Hence, it happens by chance that First Amendment concerns suggest a definition 
of offer that is consistent with the definition that would encourage design-around 
technology: one that permits investigation into market conditions. See supra notes 162-163 
and accompanying text. 
 193.  This Article refers to “preliminary injunctions,” but the analysis is the same for 
temporary restraining orders. Permanent injunctions do not raise the same concern because 
at that stage a court can adequately assess all infringement aspects as discussed infra note 
197 and accompanying text. 
 194.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1833 (9th ed. 2009). 
 195.  E.g., Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (“Any prior 
restraint on expression comes to this Court with a ‘heavy presumption’ against its 
constitutional validity.”) (citations omitted). 
 196.  Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First 
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 57 (1984). 
 197.  See generally id.; see also Lemley & Volokh, supra note 190, at 169-98 (analyzing 
the First Amendment’s implications for preliminary relief in the copyright context). 
 198.  See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text. 
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infringes until it has devoted much time to the inquiry, making preliminary 
injunctions against offers to sell infringing devices suspect under the First 
Amendment.199 
While the constitutional arguments against preliminary restrictions of 
offers to sell infringing devices suggest courts should be cautious in granting 
them, some have suggested that they may have little practical impact: 
Professors Lemley and Volokh argue that because patent law makes “selling” 
an infringing device an act of infringement, and “selling” is not speech and thus 
not protected by the First Amendment, a court could enjoin the sale of the 
device, making many offers for sale futile.200 This is generally true, but it 
ignores the potential harm from price erosion.201 
3. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the First Amendment will prevent courts or Congress from 
defining the term “offer” so broadly as to include mere market investigations, 
but will not prevent a definition that includes advertisements and similar 
promotions. In addition, at the margins, the First Amendment will prevent a 
court from preliminarily restricting an advertisement or other offer unless and 
until the court determines whether the device offered actually infringes the 
patent. 
SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This Article has demonstrated how a relatively small change in the law—
broadening the definition of an “offer” in § 271(a) of the Patent Act—can have 
far-reaching effects. The change will lead to more and earlier patent litigation 
(Part II), more extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law (Part III), a need 
for clear boundaries for the new definition of an offer (Part IV), and additional 
ripple effects such as third-party liability and free speech concerns (Part V). 
In addition to exploring these effects carefully, this Article demonstrated 
how courts should manage the change by providing an optimal definition of an 
offer and a test for when such offers should bring about liability in the United 
States. Thus, for example, an “offer” should include advertisements and 
smaller-scale promotions, but should not include mere market investigations 
that make clear the investigating company will not commercialize an infringing 
 
 199.  See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 190, at 34-39; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 
190, at 234. 
 200.  Lemley & Volokh, supra note 190, at 234. But see supra notes 53-55 and 
accompanying text (noting that the location of the offer is not determinative). 
 201.  See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text (discussing price erosion). A fully 
informed market would likely not react with downward price pressure based on an 
advertisement where the future sale was impossible (enjoined). But in some circumstances at 
least, the market will not be perfectly informed.  
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device.202 Further, the test for what constitutes advertisements and promotions 
should be guided by an “objective commercialization” test, which asks not 
whether the promotion is sent to a certain number of people, but rather whether 
it would appear to a reasonable person as an attempt to commercialize 
infringing technology.203 These tests protect a U.S. patent holder from price 
erosion without needlessly chilling the development of design-around 
technology204 and without violating the First Amendment.205 
To address concerns about unfair applications of U.S. patent law to foreign 
actors (e.g., non-U.S. persons advertising infringing technology), this Article 
recommends a multi-factor “total context test,” which considers mainly 
objective indicia of whether the advertisement contemplates future sales in the 
United States.206 Additionally, this Article recommends that courts utilize 
personal jurisdiction doctrines to limit unfair extraterritorial applications of the 
law.207 
Taken together, these recommendations allow the law governing infringing 
offers to sell to fulfill its primary policy objective, which is preventing 
commercialization of infringing technology to the commercial detriment of the 
patentee,208 without unnecessarily trampling on other rights or policies. 
  
 
 202.  Part IV. 
 203.  Part IV.B.  
 204.  Part IV.C. 
 205.  Part V.C. 
 206.  Part III.A. 
 207.  Part III.B. 
 208.  Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 
617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 
F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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